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Since the 1970s, the emphasis of federal housing policy has shifted from place-based 
subsidies to tenant-based subsidies that are provided directly to low-income 
households for the purpose of renting in the private market. Although many hoped 
that the Housing Choice Voucher, a tenant-based housing assistance program, would 
be a new tool in the fight against concentrated poverty and its associated problems, 
housing voucher recipients still face obstacles when trying to secure housing in high-
opportunity neighborhoods over the long-term. The growing body of evidence linking 
neighborhood conditions to household outcomes points to the need for a better 
understanding of how housing vouchers improve access to opportunities. While 
previous studies have explored neighborhood outcomes of housing voucher 
recipients, it still remains unclear what factors play a significant role in their 
residential location choices.  
  
My dissertation examines the constraints that housing voucher households 
face in neighborhood choices. Drawing upon data from the Moving to Opportunity 
experiment, it specifically analyzes trends in affordable housing inequality, estimates 
the effect of vehicle access on locational attainment, and explores social networks as 
a determinant of mobility behavior. The results of these analyses show that obstacles 
such as affordable housing inequality across the metropolitan area, strong social 
networks in the initial, poor neighborhood, and a lack of access to vehicles negatively 
affect the likelihood of moving to neighborhoods in which opportunities are expanded 
for low-income households. 
My findings shed light on the dynamics of residential mobility and 
neighborhood improvements for low-income households. The expansion of the 
Housing Choice Voucher program, supported by localized payment standard, 
connection to automobile subsidies, and extensive housing search services that 
provide information about the opportunities available in across all geographic units, 
may have a significant impact on poverty de-concentration and access to opportunity 
over time. These findings are also expected to bridge the gap between research and 
policy with regard to how housing voucher program could be improved in the context 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Housing policy often addresses more than the provision of affordable housing. Many housing 
programs designed to help low-income families have focused not only on the affordability 
and physical adequacy of housing, but also on achieving greater racial and economic 
diversities in neighborhoods. Deconcentrating housing subsidies may play a substantial role 
in reaching such goals, especially for current federal housing policies. Dispersal efforts that 
initially emerged in the 1970s marked a turnaround. The court-ordered Gautreaux program in 
Chicago, the nation’s first large-scale residential mobility program, vouchered out 
approximately a half of public housing tenants to majority-white neighborhoods, and some 
participants gained employment and educational benefits upon suburban relocation (DeLuca 
et al 2010, Popkin et al. 1993, Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum 2000). While retaining approaches 
to the creation and preservation of affordable housing, the federal government has expanded 
the scope of housing policy to acknowledge the importance of neighborhood opportunities for 
low-income families. As a means of deconcentrating urban poverty, the U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has turned to the Housing Choice Voucher (HCV, 
formerly Section 8) program, a tenant-based housing assistance program, to “expand housing 
choice outside areas of poverty or minority concentration” (U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development, 2001).  
Through the HCV program, eligible families pay 30 percent of their income for rental 
costs and HUD pays the rest up to a payment standard for the metropolitan area. Households 
receiving HCVs chose to live in a wider range of neighborhoods than public housing 
residents and unassisted renters (Schwartz 2010). Such deconcentration effort is crucial 





low-income households to achieve positive outcomes compared to living in less advantageous 
neighborhoods. Neighborhood improvements for low-income households have important 
implications for policies designed to enhance access to opportunity and build self-sufficiency. 
The growing body of evidence linking neighborhood effects to household outcomes points to 
the need for a better understanding of the factors that influence low-income households’ 
residential location choices. In the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) program, a 10-year 
housing mobility demonstration conducted by HUD, adults and children showed significant 
mental health improvements upon improvements in housing and neighborhood conditions 
(Briggs et al. 2010, Ludwig et al. 2013, Sanbonmatsu et al. 2011). Recently, Chetty and 
Hendren (2016) and Chetty et al. (2016) found that when compared to children remaining in 
disadvantaged neighborhoods, those that moved to better neighborhoods showed lower rates 
of teenage pregnancy, higher education attainment, higher marriage rates, and bigger earning 
gains as adults. Such emerging literature on positive outcomes on adults and children of 
housing mobility programs points to the need for a better understanding of how housing 
vouchers improve access to opportunities. 
By enabling the mobility of families in poverty areas to residential environments that 
exhibit less segregation and more social and economic opportunities, many hoped that the 
tenant-based housing assistance program could be a new tool in the fight against poverty and 
its associated problems. However, research on the links between the use of housing vouchers 
and residential locational outcomes suggests that HCV recipients still face obstacles when 
trying to secure housing in high-opportunity neighborhoods over the long-term. Evidence 
from the MTO program found that even when voucher recipients are initially required to use 
their voucher in low-poverty neighborhoods, many eventually return to high-poverty 
neighborhoods once the requirement is lifted (Sanbonmatsu et al. 2011). Explanations for the 





to neighbors and families living in high-poverty neighborhoods (Briggs et al. 2010) and rising 
rental housing costs in low-poverty neighborhoods (Rosenblatt and DeLuca 2012). Vehicle 
access and proximity to available public transportation also have positive effects on securing 
a lease in low-poverty neighborhoods with the use of a voucher in the long term (Shroder 
2002, Dawkins et al. 2015). These barriers compel low-income households to face a more 
constrained set of housing options.  
This dissertation seeks to fill part of the research gap by examining what factors are 
barriers in the relocation of low-income households receiving housing assistance to 
opportunity neighborhoods. While previous studies investigate the obstacles and 
opportunities with regard to improvements in low-income families’ neighborhood outcomes, 
it remains unclear which factors of housing vouchers matter most and which will improve the 
outcome most effectively. Analysis will proceed by refining constraints in residential location 
choices of voucher recipients at the macro, meso, and micro levels. In doing this, three 
specific questions will be addressed. First, to what extent do housing vouchers expand 
affordable housing options for low-income households in opportunity neighborhoods? 
Second, what aspects of social networks bind low-income households to the original 
neighborhoods? Third, how does vehicle access influence the types of neighborhood 
opportunities in which low-income households are able to secure housing following a move 
to a new neighborhood? Answering these questions will shed light on understanding the 
dynamics of residential mobility and neighborhood improvements for low-income households 
receiving rental housing assistance. To estimate the impact of housing vouchers statistically 
accurately, all analysis models are developed and multiple simulations are conducted using 
data from the MTO survey and neighborhood characteristics at the census tract level in the 





The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter Two presents a 
literature review of neighborhood choices of low-income households and the gap in the 
literature. In Chapter Three, the landscape of affordable housing in the MTO metropolitan 
areas is explored. Chapter Four examines the link between social networks and residential 
mobility of MTO participants. In Chapter Five, the effects of vehicle access on locational 
attainment of MTO participants during the survey period is estimated. Finally, a set of policy 






Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
This chapter presents a literature review of poverty concentration and the geography of 
opportunity, followed by discussions of the Housing Choice Voucher program, Moving to 
Opportunity, and constraints in residential location choices of voucher recipients. The scope 
of housing policies has expanded to address a much broader range of social policy objectives. 
The emerging concerns of poverty concentration have shifted the paradigm of federal housing 
policy to promote deconcentration of subsidized households, and such historical evolution of 
federal housing policies has shaped discussions on the expansion of neighborhood 
opportunity to low-income households. I explore backgrounds in the rise of the tenant-based 
housing subsidy and residential mobility programs, and draw attention to the gap in the 
literature with respect to neighborhood choices of households receiving housing assistance. 
 
2.1. Poverty Concentration 
Since the 1970s, neighborhood effects of concentrated poverty have been explored by 
focusing on the emergence of high-poverty neighborhoods and consequent challenges faced 
by poor, minority residents with respect to crime, health, education, employment, and well-
being. From the perspective of sociology, the rise of inner city poverty has primarily been 
grounded on Wilson’s two striking works, The Truly Disadvantaged (1986) and When Work 
Disappears (1996). He argued that increasingly concentrated poverty in urban areas during 
the 1970s and 1980s was mainly due to the suburbanizing movement of middle-class 
households, social services, institutional resources, and human and finance capital. While 
scholars explained high concentrations of the poor in terms of spatial mismatch between the 
inner city residential locations and suburbanized low-skill job opportunities (Kain 1992, 





to poorly enforced fair housing laws (Massey and Denton 1993), most studies highlighted 
that deprived conditions of concentrated poverty in the central city has reinforced the social 
dislocation of the minority residents (Jargowsky 1996, Wilson 1986, 1996). Furthermore, 
racial discrimination and the lack of affordable housing in suburban housing markets has 
limited low-income black households’ ability to suburbanize to take advantage of 
decentralizing job opportunities. Disconnection with the resources and networks has 
exacerbated conditions of inner city neighborhoods that suffer from serious crime, health, and 
education problems, eventually further limiting the opportunities for people residing in such 
locations. 
Several studies on neighborhood effects of concentrated poverty have examined 
health, employment, earnings, crime and delinquency, and unfavorable sexual and fertility 
outcomes for adolescents. Ellen and Turner (1997) reviewed the literature of the effect of 
neighborhood attributes on the socioeconomic status of an individual’s life at different stages. 
They concluded that there is an abundance of evidence that those living in poor, inner-city 
neighborhoods showed lower education attainment and higher crime involvement. Sampson 
et al. (2002) found that neighborhood ties and patterns of interaction, collective efficacy, 
institutional resources, and routine activity patterns were related to crime outcomes, such as 
records of homicide, robbery, stranger assault, and violent property victimization. A stream 
of empirical evidence on the effects of concentrated poverty has led many in the federal 
government to rethink housing policy.  
 
2.2. The Geography of Opportunity 
The concept of the “geography of opportunity” was grounded upon the theoretical framework 
by Galster and Killen (1995), which introduced the importance of a geographic element in 





opportunity, stating that all people in need should be treated equally by markets and 
institutions, but some might be left behind just because they live far apart from the resources 
that they need. They viewed opportunity as having dimensions of both process and prospects, 
and characterized the metropolitan opportunity structure and an individual’s perceived 
opportunity set as associated perspectives of each dimension. The metropolitan opportunity 
structure serves as a package of markets, institutions, and systems that convert personal 
attributes into outputs affecting social advancement. Several elements of the opportunity 
structure such as education, labor market, criminal justice, social welfare, and social 
networks, constrain individuals’ collection of choice sets which can also be influenced by the 
person’s indelible endowments (e.g. race), acquired attributes (e.g. education, job), and the 
person’s subjective perceptions of how the opportunity structure will judge and transform 
these attributes.  
Galster and Sharkey (2017) provide a recent review of the evidence on various 
dimensions of inequality of opportunity and outcomes. Spatial inequality is prevalent in 
economic status, access to well-paid jobs, exposure to environmental hazards, and exposure 
to community violence. Trends in segregation of neighborhoods and schools are consistent 
with persistent racial and ethnic inequality and the long-term rise of concentrated poverty. 
Economic segregation within racial and ethnic groups, especially for black and Hispanic 
families, has risen over time (Bischoff and Reardon 2014, Jargowsky 2015). Inequality of 
employment opportunities has grown due to inequality in education and labor market across 
cities and metropolitan areas (Lindley and Machin 2014), and racial and economic gaps in 
exposure to environmental toxins have persisted (Downey 2007, Ard 2015). Only the 
inequality in community violence between racial groups have declined over the past twenty 





Several scholars have extended the discussion on the geography of opportunity by 
focusing on the philosophy and value of equality. Arneson (1989) argued that in order for 
opportunities to be equal individuals must be aware of available options to them and must 
have an equivalent number and types of choices. Dawkins (2017) expanded the discussion in 
terms of geographic equality of opportunity. He argued that equal spatial accessibility to 
opportunities (or a spatially uniform distribution of resources) in terms of certain goods or 
social networks is required across all geographic units, and that opportunity in the context of 
housing policy can be defined as “opportunities to consume housing itself, in addition to the 
prospects for enhancing well-being that are provided by the geographic resources that are 
accessible from one’s home” (Dawkins 2017, p. 904). His definition of the equality of spatial 
access criterion has implications in multiple policies from residential mobility assistance and 
housing counseling to inclusionary land-use regulations, which ensure that individuals can 
freely make a residential mobility to gain access to a desirable resource if that resource is 
unavailable at the individual’s current neighborhood. 
Academic discussions on the geography of opportunity have become substantial in 
the realms of public policy and urban planning. The federal government’s charge to 
Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing (AFFH) is one of the remarkable results. The Fair 
Housing Act was enacted in 1968 to prohibit housing discrimination on the basis of race, 
color, religion, sex, and national origin. Disability and familial status were added in 1988. For 
federally assisted housing, HUD has applied this charge to ensure that subsidized households 
do not cluster by race or income in the sites of assisted units, establishing site selection 
criteria that helps minorities locate to places other than racially segregated areas in order to 
expand opportunities (Lev 1981). In July 2015, HUD released a final rule implementing the 
Fair Housing Act that aims not only to overcome housing discrimination but also to increase 





fair housing goals that include “strategically enhancing access to opportunity” through 
“promoting greater housing choice within or outside of areas of concentrated poverty and 
greater access to areas of high opportunity” (24 CFR §5.150 2015). The clustering of voucher 
families has become more crucial especially for public housing agencies which administer 
federal housing assistance programs. Specific content requirements are provided in the 
publicly available Assessment Tools, AFFH data and mapping tool (AFFH-T), for use by 
program participating local governments to access HUD-provided data to conduct the fair 
housing analysis required as part of the Assessment of Fair Housing. Based on the assessment 
of location, availability, and accessibility of affordable housing, the fair housing law 
promotes State and localities to overcome spatial segregation and discourage discrimination 
in all housing choices. 
 
2.3. Housing Choice Vouchers 
Federal housing policy has evolved to be consistent with the broad objective to link 
disadvantaged households to opportunity neighborhoods. Since the 1970s, the emphasis of 
federal housing policy administered by HUD has shifted from place-based subsidies that 
support the construction of affordable housing to tenant-based subsidies provided directly to 
low-income households for the purpose of renting privately owned units. While the Low-
Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) is still a major place-based program in providing 
affordable rental housing to moderately-low-income households, it is administered by the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) program, a tenant-
based rental subsidy, is the largest federal rental housing assistance program administered by 
HUD (Landis and McClure 2010). The HCV program is designed in part to enable 
households to overcome these constraints and secure affordable rental housing units in a 





expand opportunities for assisted renters in areas where they have traditionally been 
underrepresented, particularly in locations exhibiting lower levels of racial and economic 
segregation and in areas offering greater access to employment and other opportunities (U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development 2008: ch. 2, p. 2-1).  
As a demand-side approach, the HCV program was designed to be a flexible and 
cost-effective way of providing affordable rental housing to low-income households. The 
program has aimed to reduce poverty concentration and offer voucher holders greater 
accessibility to various neighborhood opportunities. Despite this program goal, many voucher 
households remain concentrated in neighborhoods with fewer opportunities. Findings of 
previous research show that many voucher recipients are disproportionately located in 
racially segregated and impoverished neighborhoods, even with the increased budget for 
housing consumption (Pendall 2000, Devine et al. 2002, McClure et al. 2015). Neither 
voucher users nor public housing residents can find enough housing in high-opportunity 
neighborhoods (McClure 2010). 
The choice of whether or where to move is influenced by household-level factors, 
such as household income, marital status, presence of children, age, and family size, and 
neighborhood-level factors such as crime, school quality, and access to jobs. Households 
normally make compromises among a range of neighborhood characteristics to realize their 
prioritized needs. However, low-income families face constraints in the housing market, 
which hinder those to move to preferred neighborhoods. A lack of public transportation 
service, a limited affordable housing stock, and racial and economic discriminatory barriers 
have been factors that decrease housing options in locations offering greater access to 
employment and other opportunities. 
Several case studies have examined mobility programs using a voucher. Jacob (2004) 





offered vouchers following the demolition of their public housing units. These households’ 
locational outcomes were compared to a control group of households whose units were not 
scheduled for demolition. Compared to the control group, those whose units were scheduled 
for demolition used their vouchers within census tracts with poverty rates of 53 percent, 
compared to the control group households who resided in neighborhoods with an average 
poverty rate of 67 percent. Carlson et al. (2012) employed a propensity score matching 
procedure to control for selection bias in their examination of the short-term and long-term 
locational outcomes for voucher recipients living in the state of Wisconsin. Compared with a 
sample of households with otherwise similar household characteristics, those receiving a 
voucher did not display markedly different locational outcomes in the short term, but after 
four years, voucher recipients lived in neighborhoods with observably lower poverty rates 
and unemployment rates, although the differences were small. 
 
2.4. Moving to Opportunity 
HUD has introduced a range of housing mobility programs to specifically deconcentrate low-
income families that receive rental housing assistance. Residential mobility programs were 
established in response to litigation against HUD for past discrimination and segregation in 
public and other subsidized housing programs, which usually involved housing vouchers and 
counseling or other forms of housing search assistance (Schwartz 2010). The most famous 
litigation program is the court-ordered Gautreaux program in Chicago. The Chicago Housing 
Authority vouchered out approximately half of the public housing tenants to majority-white 
neighborhoods, while the rest of the families remained in the central city to address 
discrimination against the black located in concentrated poor, black areas. Some vouchered-
out participants experienced employment and educational benefits throughout suburban 





However, evidence from the Gautreaux program is limited due to its administrative procedure 
and design; participants were non-randomly selected through home visits and credit checks 
(Popkin et al. 2000).  
Inspired by the Gautreaux program, the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) program was 
initiated in 1994 for the purpose of understanding the impact of geographic-restricted housing 
assistance on the outcomes of participating low-income families in five large metropolitan 
areas: Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York. Such housing dispersal 
programs was built upon the argument that high concentrations of poverty result in 
community decline and poor socio-economic outcomes for individuals, and the expectation 
that housing dispersal produces relief from the effects of concentrated poverty and alleviates 
individual poverty through enhanced employment and earnings (Goetz and Chapple 2010). 
In the MTO experiment, over 4,600 households were randomly assigned to one of 
three groups: (1) the experimental group received a Section 8 voucher along with housing 
search assistance and was required to use the voucher in a low-poverty neighborhood with 
poverty rates less than 10%; (2) the Section 8 comparison group received a voucher but faced 
no geographic restrictions on its use; and (3) the control group of households did not receive 
a voucher and remained in their current assisted housing unit. Participants were recruited 
from those residing in project-based subsidized housing in neighborhoods with poverty rates 
of 40 percent or more (Orr et al. 2003). This research design allows researchers to isolate the 
treatment of the voucher itself, and examine the impact of the location restriction of 
assignment to a low-poverty neighborhood, controlling for factors that influence voucher 
selection. The counterfactual in this case is the control group of public housing residents, 
allowing researchers to identify the “treatment” of receiving either a location-restricted 
voucher with housing search assistance or an unrestricted voucher. After households were 





conducted: an interim-survey five to seven years after random assignment and a final survey 
conducted 10 to 15 years after random assignment. 
The MTO Final Evaluation (Sanbonmatsu et al. 2011) finds that by the end of the 
study, households assigned to the experimental and Section 8 comparison groups resided in 
neighborhoods with average poverty rates of 31 percent and 33 percent respectively, 
compared to the 40 percent average poverty rate in neighborhoods inhabited by those 
assigned to the control group. The neighborhoods chosen by those in the experimental and 
Section 8 group were also inhabited by fewer female-headed households and by households 
earning higher median incomes. Impacts on racial segregation were much weaker. While 
those in the experimental and Section 8 comparison groups lived in neighborhoods with 
fewer minority residents compared to those in the control group, both the experimental and 
Section 8 groups lived in neighborhoods that were overwhelmingly populated by minority 
residents. Furthermore, Nguyen et al. (2016) compares locational attainment of MTO 
treatment groups. Compared to the control group, Experimental and Section 8 groups 
experienced substantial improvements in neighborhood conditions across diverse measures, 
including economic conditions, social systems, physical features of the environment, and 
health outcomes. 
As found in the housing voucher literature, MTO participants also achieved limited 
success in stable mobility towards neighborhoods in which opportunities are expanded for 
low-income households. Most participants initially gained access to less disadvantage 
neighborhoods but lost access soon thereafter moving back to the original neighborhoods or 
similarly distressed (Briggs et al. 2010). Few sustained access to better neighborhoods over 
the long term, and those that did not initially gain access rarely ever gained access (Dawkins 






2.5. Constraints in Residential Location Choices 
There are several factors that limit the degree of neighborhood improvement experienced by 
low-income households receiving rental housing assistance. The literature accounts for 
multiple scales of constraints in residential location choices: macro-level (market- or 
metropolitan-level) forces, meso-level (program-level) barriers, and mirco-level (individual-
level) limitations.  
Macro-level forces include structural aspects of the constraints in residential location 
choices for housing voucher households. Voucher recipients face a limited set of housing 
options in the private housing market due to a shortage of affordable housing in high-
opportunity neighborhoods. Previous studies suggest that the availability of affordable 
housing tends to be negatively associated with the existing supply of market-rate rental units 
in neighborhoods with greater accessibility to opportunity (Basolo and Nguyen 2005, Talen 
2010). Housing options are even further restricted by transportation constraints. Metropolitan 
areas have been evolved in expansive and complex ways, leading most quality neighborhoods 
to have less access to public transit and to make cars necessary even in transit-rich places for 
shopping, work, and recreation. It was found that the availability of public transportation is an 
important factor that determines the location of moves (Varady and Walker 2007). 
Meso-level barriers include programmatic aspects of the constraints in residential 
location choices in the Housing Choice Voucher program. Program design constrains voucher 
households’ location choices in various ways. In theory, vouchers augment a household’s 
financial capacity to occupy an appropriate residential unit and eventually improve the 
quality of life by relocating to a better neighborhood. However, voucher families have 
difficulty selecting a residential unit with a rent above a payment standard set by Fair Market 
Rents (FMRs), which is HUD's estimate of the amount needed to cover rent and utility costs 





spend no more than 40 percent of their income when entering the program or moving to a 
new unit. The limitation of FMR is its inflexibility. Although rental prices vary across a 
metropolitan area, a single FMR is applied to determine the maximum subsidy which limits 
available housing options to areas with rents below the FMR. McClure (2010, 2013) finds 
that the majority of rental units in low-poverty neighborhoods are listed above the FMR 
levels. Moreover, voucher families have difficulty using vouchers when they move to a 
jurisdiction where the program is administered by a different local public housing agency 
(PHA), although such a move is permitted under the program’s portability provisions 
(Climaco et al. 2008). In the administration procedure, these “portability moves” might be 
restricted by PHAs for new voucher recipients before their first lease-up within the 
jurisdiction, and might even be cancelled if the household that wishes to move fails to lease-
up in the new location in a given time period. Greenlee (2011) found a disincentive to 
portability moves such that additional costs of receiving portable vouchers often uncovered 
by the federal government increase the burden on PHAs’ financial and administrative 
responsibilities. 
In addition to program design aspects, discrimination of landlords limit housing 
options for housing voucher households at the program level. Many voucher families 
experience discrimination related to their housing search process. In the sociological 
literature, the perception of racial discrimination by landlords has been shown to be a major 
barrier in residential mobility (Ondrich et al. 1999, Weisbrod and Vidal 1981). Graves (2016) 
found at least two kinds of discrimination: racial discrimination and source of income 
discrimination. Racial discrimination discourages minority voucher households from 
relocating to predominantly white neighborhoods, generally in the suburbs, despite the 
availability of housing options in such areas (Yinger 1998). Source of income discrimination, 





options for voucher households due to landlords’ reluctance to accept vouchers. Although 
legislation prohibiting source of income discrimination has been shown to be associated with 
improved neighborhood outcomes (Freeman 2012, Metzger 2014), voucher families are often 
rejected based on their employment or receipt of other government subsidies (Popkin and 
Cunningham 2000). Unfortunately, the Fair Housing Act covers racial discrimination only, 
and not discrimination of source of income.  
Micro-level constraints include behavioral aspects of the limitations in moving 
housing voucher households to quality neighborhoods. In general, staying close to social ties 
is central to the lives of many poor families. They are less likely to make a distance move 
because survival of poor families demands sacrifice (Stack 1974). Briggs et al. (2010) found 
in their study on the Moving to Opportunity experiment that families moved to 
neighborhoods in which they were able to exercise their strong kinship or friendship for 
practical help or emotional support (Further discussion in Chapter 4.1.2.). Also, an 
individual’s access to a vehicle inhibits residential choices. Only about a quarter of urban 
households earning less than $20,000 in 2001 traveled without a car, and even those who had 
no car took an estimated 34 percent of their trips in 2001 either by borrowing a car or riding 
with a household who had one (Pucher and Renne 2003). Because even low-income 
households usually have cars, people who earn little and have no car access face tremendous 
constraints in their residential choices. Housing voucher households are more likely to 
sacrifice other neighborhood amenities to maximize access to public transit or gain access to 
a car through social networks. 
Most of the barriers at multiple scales are connected to each other, and consequently 
generate more limitations in residential location choices. For housing voucher households, a 
lack of affordable housing in expensive markets is affected by the applicable Fair Market 





recipients for which they can rent without spending more than 30 percent of their income. 
While vouchers can expand housing options within the PHA jurisdictions, moving to transit-
poor places is influenced by an access to a vehicle. Failure to rent a unit in high-opportunity 
neighborhoods due to discrimination is likely to lead voucher recipients to move back to their 
initial neighborhood where strong social networks is prevalent. Therefore, it is important to 
take a comprehensive approach to address such constraints in residential location choices for 
voucher households. 
 
2.6. The Gap in the Literature 
While the studies discussed above investigate the obstacles and opportunities in residential 
location choices of housing voucher households in efforts to improve low-income families’ 
neighborhood outcomes, it remains unclear which factors matter most and which will 
improve the outcome most effectively. My dissertation focuses on the three most unexplored, 
overlapping barriers of residential location choices of low-income households receiving a 
housing voucher: affordable housing, social networks, and vehicle access.    
A missing link in the body of research on a shortage of affordable housing in the 
Housing Choice Voucher program is the impact of Fair Market Rents (FMRs) on location 
choices. Each voucher recipient’s payment standard is determined by the FMR, and HUD 
only covers the difference between the payment standard and 30 percent of a voucher 
household’s adjusted monthly income when they choose a unit in which the gross rent is 
above the payment standard. As a result, it is likely to limit affordable housing options to 
areas with rents below the applicable FMR and discourage voucher households from renting a 
unit in safer neighborhoods with better schools and access to jobs or other services. While 
evidence from empirical studies suggests that the choice set of voucher households is 





(McClure 2010, 2013), less is known to what extent housing vouchers reduce segregation of 
affordable housing across the metropolitan area. In addition, while HUD has proposed 
establishing Small Area FMRs, localized FMRs that vary by zip code, little is known about 
whether this change in the program rule improves affordable housing inequality across the 
metropolitan area. 
Intra-neighborhood social networks also influence the relocation of housing voucher 
recipients. The vast body of literature that addressed residential mobility of low-income 
households with respect to social networks found that social relations were the driving factor 
in residential mobility, with mixed results on strong social ties (i.e. kinship, friendship) and 
social resources (i.e. resources for costly social services – childcare, ride to work). Findings 
from the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) experiment also demonstrate that social networks 
persisted at the core of most participants’ lives, regardless of relocation, and influenced how 
they structured their daily lives. However, little attention has been paid to whether households 
tend to live closer to relatives and friends for companionship or emotional support, or for 
essential practical help such as childcare. Also, no studies to date have examined whether 
social networks in the old neighborhood and past residential mobility affect current 
residential mobility, although many findings from studies on housing mobility programs and 
vouchers shed light on the missing link between the tendency of MTO households (or 
voucher households in general) to move back to disadvantaged neighborhoods.  
Furthermore, the literature suggests that while the links between transportation access 
and residential location decisions have been explored in-depth, there is a paucity of studies 
examining the impact of transportation access on the neighborhood choices of low income 
households receiving rental housing assistance. One unexplored explanation is that housing 
voucher recipients, many of whom lack access to automobiles, are unable to search for 





assistance is provided, transit-poor suburban environments may not be perceived as offering 
access to opportunity if the opportunities can only be reached via the automobile. Part of the 
challenge is likely due to the limited number of datasets offering information on car access, 
housing assistance, and residential location outcomes.  
To this end, my dissertation seeks to answer one central research question: What 
factors are barriers in the relocation of low-income households receiving housing assistance 
to opportunity neighborhoods? Under this central question, three specific questions are 
addressed. First, to what extent does the Housing Choice Voucher program expand affordable 
housing options for low-income households in opportunity neighborhoods? Second, what 
aspects of social networks bind low-income households to the original neighborhoods? Third, 
how does vehicle access influence the types of neighborhood opportunities in which low-
income households are able to secure housing following a move to a new neighborhood? To 
answer these questions, I examine the impacts of Fair Market Rents, social networks, and 
vehicle access on residential location choices of housing voucher households. In the 
following chapters, drawing upon data from the MTO survey and various tract-level 
characteristics, I specifically explore trends in affordable housing supply and inequality, 
analyze social networks as a determinant of mobility, and estimate the effect of vehicle access 
on locational attainment. Using the MTO data set allows me to control for unobserved 
characteristics which influence the likelihood of applying for a rental voucher, because 









Chapter 3: Landscape of Affordable Housing 
 
This chapter explores the landscape of affordable housing in the Moving to Opportunity 
metropolitan areas. Evidence suggests that growth in demand has been the primary force 
behind the widespread tightness in rental markets (Joint Center for Housing Studies of 
Harvard University 2015). However, little attention has been paid to the dynamics of 
segregation of affordable housing for housing voucher households. During the 2000 and 2009 
period, I examine the dynamics of the (1) affordable housing gap for low-income households, 
(2) spatial distribution of affordable housing, and (3) affordable housing inequality for 
housing voucher households. Furthermore, I run a simulation of implementing Small Area 
Fair Market Rents to address whether a localized payment standard reduce segregation of 
affordable housing for housing voucher households.  
 
3.1. Background 
3.1.1. Rental Housing Crisis and Affordability 
Rental demand has recently grown even though the supply of affordable housing that has 
shrunk. The share of all U.S. renters reached a peak of 37 percent in 2015 for the first time, 
since the mid-1960s (Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University 2015). The 
collapse of the housing bubble in 2007 which is a primary cause of the broader economic 
downturn played an important role in the high rental demand. This sharp downturn increased 
housing instability by exposing homeowners to foreclosure. Tightened access to mortgage 
credit (Fligstein and Goldstein 2010, Lewis 2010, Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011) and a 
decline in income due to job loss (Schwartz et al. 2016) drove many to foreclosure, making 





the national rental housing market, the heterogeneity of housing markets across metropolitan 
areas has produced divergent rent trends at the metropolitan level. 
 In response to significant job losses and rising unemployment rates especially among 
the young during the recession, the rental housing market experienced a rise in vacancy rates 
and decline in real rents in most markets (DiPasquale 2011). A sudden decline in rental 
demand created downward pressure on rents. Collinson (2011) found that rents fell by a 
significant six- to eight-percent range from 2007 to 2010 in housing markets that were hit 
hard by foreclosures, such as Phoenix, Arizona, and Tampa, Florida. Although high vacancy 
rates and low rent growth likely alleviated rental housing affordability in the short term, 
weakening housing market fundamentals created challenges for property owners, which 
potentially threatens the future supply and quality of affordable rental housing. Shilling 
(2010) provided a detailed analysis of the impact of foreclosures on the rental stock, showing 
that rental foreclosures are highly concentrated in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods.  
 Rather than suffering from high vacancy rates, some large markets have experienced 
consistent rising rents over time. In a study of the 11 largest metropolitan areas in the U.S., 
the Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, New York City, 
Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Washington, DC metropolitan areas, Ellen and Karfunkel 
(2016) found that the median gross rent rose and the rental vacancy rate dropped in 10 of the 
11 metropolitan areas between 2006 and 2014. In such housing markets with steady or rising 
demand, inelastic housing supply played an important role in significant upward pressure on 
rents. Glaeser and Gyourko (2008) demonstrated the volatility of rental housing cost in large 
coastal metropolitan areas, in which regulatory constraints and limited developable land 
hinder rental housing stock growth and contribute to rising rents. In the economic literature, 





the poor depends critically on the price elasticity of supply in the market (Matlack and Vigdor 
2008). 
 The rental housing crisis forces the majority of renters to face affordability 
challenges. Spending large fractions of income on rent has been a longstanding policy 
concern. Quigley and Raphael (2004) found that the median renter saw a substantial increase 
in the share of income spent on housing in the 1970s, while low-income renters have been 
spending a larger share of income on rent. One approach researchers commonly use in the 
policy contexts is to choose a benchmark income level, and define housing affordability as 30 
percent or less of income spent on rent. HUD classifies housing costs exceeding 30 percent of 
income as moderate cost burdens and costs exceeding 50 percent of income as severe cost 
burdens. While analyses of housing affordability problems have generally focused on supply-
side determinants (Gyourko and Linneman 1993), evidence of a link between income 
inequality and housing affordability has garnered considerable attention. Quigley and 
Raphael (2004) decomposed the affordability changes decade-by-decade from 1960 to 2000, 
and found that nearly half of the decline in the affordability of rental housing during the 
1970s is attributable to a decline in the median income of renter households. DiPasquale and 
Murray (2017) showed that during the recession the real price of rental housing services was 
at its highest recorded level, whereas renters’ incomes were lower than in 1970. Joint Center 
for Housing Studies of Harvard University (2015) also provides evidence of the nationwide 
cost burdens over the last decade. Between 2001 and 2014, national trends in rising rents and 
falling incomes pushed the number of cost-burdened renters up from 14.8 million to a new 
high of 21.3 million. Even worse, the number of these households with severe burdens 
jumped from 7.5 million to 11.4 million.  
 Rent burdens, i.e. cost burdens for renters, tend to be more severe for low-income 





the cost-burdened share rose from 69 percent in 2001 to 77 percent in 2014 among renters 
earning between $15,000 and $30,000, with a ten percentage-point increase in the incidence 
of severe burdens accounting for all of the change. Ellen and Karfunkel (2016) also showed 
that in 2014 more than half of low-income renters, earning less than the 25th percentile renter 
income in their metropolitan area, faced rents at or above half of their household income in 
the 11 largest metro areas. Scholars argue that severe rent burden is a serious national 
problem because it leaves very little income for families to spend on other essentials, such as 
food, medical care, transportation expenses, education, and childcare. 
 Finding affordable housing has been more difficult for low-income households, even 
though the rental housing stock has somewhat expanded since the recession in response to 
record growth in demand. The nationwide lack of sufficient affordable housing for the poor is 
well illustrated in several studies. The HUD’s Worst Case Housing Needs report (Steffen et 
al. 2015) illustrated inadequate supply of rental units that are affordable to extremely low-
income (ELI) renters whose income is at or below 30 percent of the area median income, 
showing that only 65 affordable units exist for every 100 ELI renters nationwide. If both the 
affordability and availability are taken into account, only 31 affordable and available units 
exist for every 100 ELI renter households (Aurand et al. 2017). Leopold et al. (2015) also 
found that between 2000 and 2013, the number of ELI renter households increased by 38 
percent, while the supply of adequate, affordable, and available rental homes for these 
households increased by only seven percent, resulting in a widening of the housing 
affordability gap over time.  
Backgrounds in the dynamics of rental housing markets and housing affordability for 
low-income households enable us to understand the extent to which low-income renters 
expand affordable housing options through rental housing assistance. Low-income renters in 





housing vouchers. Nevertheless, little is known about how the affordable housing gap varies 
across neighborhoods, and to what extent low-income renters improve housing affordability 
through housing assistance. A shortage of affordable housing is prevalent nationwide, but it is 
unclear whether such shortage exists in high-poverty neighborhoods, predominantly minority 
neighborhoods or affluent neighborhoods.  
 
3.1.2. Fair Market Rents and Neighborhood Choices 
The Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) program is targeted to families who need them most. 
The Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998 requires local Public Housing 
Agencies (PHAs) to provide 75 percent of its vouchers to households whose incomes do not 
exceed 30 percent of the area median income (Hunt et al. 1998). Although the demand-side 
subsidy has offered low-income families more flexibility in location choices, those receiving 
housing vouchers are still constrained in moving to high-opportunity neighborhoods. The vast 
body of literature has addressed mobility of voucher households and their neighborhood 
outcomes. To explore economic, racial, and spatial concentration of housing vouchers, 
Metzger (2014) computed a Herfindahl index, and found that voucher households are more 
segregated by race and income, and more clustered within specific census tracts, than a 
comparison group of households earning less than $15,000. The locations of voucher 
recipients tend to be associated with less sustainable neighborhood characteristics in terms of 
accessibility, pedestrian orientation, connectivity, and diversity (Talen and Koschinsky 2011, 
2014).  
While some scholars have examined programmatic problems of segregated 
neighborhood outcomes of HCV households, others have identified structural aspects in HCV 
households’ constrained location choices (See Chapter 2.5 for details). Despite making 





subsidy mechanism as a constraint for a wide variety of neighborhood choices. Only McClure 
(2010, 2013) found that the payment standard of the program, Fair Market Rents (FMRs), 
limits affordable housing options to areas with rents below the FMR in which moderate- and 
high-poverty rates are exhibited. 
To calculate the subsidy level, each HCV recipient’s payment standard is determined 
based on the Fair Market Rent after adjustment for household size. The FMR is HUD's 
estimate of the amount needed to cover the rent and utility costs in a given local area, mostly 
setting at the 40th percentile of market rents for standard-quality, recently-rented units in an 
entire metropolitan area. A single metro-wide FMR is designed to be high enough to provide 
a variety of housing and neighborhood choices. The housing assistance payment (HAP) is 
calculated as the lower of gross rent or the payment standard minus 30 percent of adjusted 
income. If a voucher household chooses a unit in which gross rent is below the payment 
standard, the amount above 30 percent of adjusted monthly income is fully subsidized. If a 
selected unit’s gross rent is higher than the payment standard, HUD only covers the 
difference between payment standard and 30 percent of the income. In such cases, the 
family’s share of housing costs may exceed 30 percent, but the program limits tenant rent to 
40 percent of the income.  
Presumably, the current method of HAP determination might increase voucher 
households’ inability to rent a unit in high-quality neighborhoods, because a single FMR 
within a metropolitan area or county fails to properly reflect rising rents in volatile housing 
markets. Rental units affordable to HCV households depend on Fair Market Rents, 
considering most voucher households have extremely low income. If FMRs are not high 
enough, voucher households may not be able to rent a unit in a desirable neighborhood. 
Several studies showed that setting FMRs at the 50th percentile of market rents was not 





et al. (2015) found that between 2000 and 2010, voucher households in the 50 largest 
metropolitan areas became more concentrated and more likely to live in neighborhoods with 
poverty rates at or above 30 percent, even though 50th percentile FMRs were used in most of 
those areas at some point during that period. Similarly, Collinson and Ganong (2017) found 
that the main effect of the initial implementation of 50th percentile FMRs in 2001 had been to 
raise costs without improving the quality of the housing where voucher holders lived. 
HUD has tried to implement Small Area Fair Market Rents within many U.S. 
metropolitan areas, which would be used to set Housing Choice Voucher payment standards 
that vary by Zip Code. The idea behind Small Area FMRs is simply about more residential 
choices. Through the housing voucher program, eligible families spend 30 percent of their 
income to pay for part of the rental costs and HUD pays the rest up to a payment standard. 
Each recipient’s payment standard is determined by the FMR, which is HUD's estimate of the 
amount needed to cover rent and utility costs in a given metropolitan area or county. HUD 
only covers the difference between the payment standard and 30 percent of a voucher 
household’s adjusted monthly income when they choose a unit in which the gross rent is 
above the payment standard. As a result, it is likely to limit affordable housing options to 
areas with rents below the applicable FMR and discourage voucher households to rent a unit 
in safer neighborhoods with better schools and access to jobs or other services. However, a 
final rule on using Small Area FMRs was recently suspended, as HUD claimed that they 
needed more time to analyze the impact of the policy change’s costs and benefits. 
In an effort to expand opportunity, a test of small area Fair Market Rents already 
showed positive impacts on relocation to quality neighborhoods. Drawing upon data from the 
Small Area FMR Demonstration Program in five housing authorities, Meryl et al. (2017) 
found that high-rent zip codes offer more opportunities than low-rent zip codes do, although 





the impact of the policy change on neighborhood quality of HCV recipients in the Dallas, TX 
metropolitan area. Their difference-in-difference model found that quality of neighborhoods 
chosen by HCV households in Dallas showed higher increase than HCV households in 
nearby areas using a single FMR. In the economic literature, Geyer (2017) simulated how 
changes in a geographic unit of FMR influence voucher households’ neighborhood outcomes, 
resulting from neighborhood preferences estimation. The policy simulation suggests that 
allowing a payment standard to vary based on census tract would be twice as effective as, and 
63 percent less expensive than, increasing the current maximum subsidy by 20 percent. 
However, less is known to what extent Small Area FMRs expand housing options in quality 
neighborhoods and reduce segregation of affordable housing across the metropolitan area. 
 
3.2. Data and Methods 
3.2.1. Geography of Affordable Housing 
The geography of affordable housing is explored to understand how housing market 
conditions have changed over time for participants in the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) 
demonstration. Five MTO metropolitan areas are used as targeted study areas. To use 
consistent metropolitan area boundaries, I use the definition of metropolitan areas delineated 
by the Office of Management and Budget as of December 2009. Since most MTO 
participants were randomly-assigned from 1994 through 1998 and stayed 10 to 15 years in 
the demonstration, I use 2000 and 2009 data to depict the geography of affordable housing 
after random assignment. Drawing data from multiple sources published in 2000 and 2009 
including Census 2000, 2009 American Community Survey, Picture of Subsidized 
Households, Comprehensive Housing Affordability Strategy (CHAS) and Fair Market Rents 
(FMRs), the dynamics of metropolitan rental housing markets and spatial distribution of 





demand in rental housing by affordability in terms of income as a percentage of the area 
median income (AMI), (2) trends in the affordable housing gap by neighborhood poverty 
rates, and (3) trends in the share of rental units affordable to housing voucher households by 
neighborhood poverty rates.  
To understand the extent to which housing vouchers expand affordable housing 
options for low-income households, I select extremely low-income (ELI) and very low-
income renters (VLI) as comparison groups in the analyses. Households belong to these 
groups are similar to voucher households regarding levels of income in particular, given that 
eligibility for a housing voucher requires families’ income do not exceed 50 percent of the 
AMI, and Public Housing Agencies must provide at least 75 percent of its voucher to 
applicants whose incomes are at or below 30 percent of the AMI. As in other housing 
assistance programs administered by HUD, the income limits of the housing voucher program 
are determined based upon the AMI. Three terms of income limits are defined: “extremely 
low-income” (ELI), “very vow-income” (VLI), and “low-income” (LI). Households whose 
incomes do not exceed the higher of the federal poverty level or 30 percent of AMI are 
defined as ELI, where as those earning between 31 and 50 percent of AMI as VLI and those 
earning at or below 80 percent of AMI are defined as LI. 
 Affordability measures the extent to which enough rental housing units of different 
costs can provide each renter household with a unit it can afford (based on the 30-percent-of-
income standard), which addresses whether sufficient housing units would exist if allocated 
solely on the basis of cost. The affordable stock includes both vacant and occupied units. For 
ELI and VLI renters, a rental unit is considered affordable to a renter if the gross rent does 
not exceed 30 percent of the maximum income of their income category. I use 2000 and 2009 
CHAS data to obtain the number of affordable rental units by income category. For housing 





FMR, because voucher households are awarded housing assistance payments that cover the 
difference between 30 percent of a household’s adjusted gross income and a payment 
standard which is mainly determined by the FMR (McClure 2005). 2000 Census and 2009 
ACS are used to obtain the number of rental units by gross rent category, and 2000 and 2009 
FMRs are used to obtain the applicable FMR for each metropolitan area. I determine the 
number of affordable units by computing the number of rental units with the gross rent below 
the applicable FMR. While HUD usually sets a single FMR for every county and 
metropolitan area, large-scale metropolitan areas have more than one FMR areas. In case of 
MTO metropolitan areas, between 2000 and 2009, Baltimore and Los Angeles had two 
FMRs, Boston had five FMRs, Chicago had seven FMRs, and New York had eight FMR 
areas within each metropolitan area. As more FMR areas exist, voucher households would 
have more affordable housing options as local housing market conditions would be well 
accounted for. 
 In addition to the concept of affordability, availability is considered as an additional 
criterion to determine the severity of the affordable housing gap. Availability measures the 
extent to which affordable rental housing units are available to renters within a particular 
income range. Availability is a more restrictive concept, because units that meet the definition 
must be available and affordable. Some renters choose to spend less than 30 percent of their 
incomes on rent, occupying housing that is affordable to renters of lower incomes. These 
units thus are not available to lower income renters. A unit is available at a given level of 
income if (1) it is affordable at that level and (2) it is occupied by a renter either at that 
income level or at a lower level or is vacant. Measures of affordability and availability 
compare the entire rental housing stock with the entire renter population, which allows me to 





 To explore the spatial distribution of affordable housing stock, I chose poverty rates 
as a neighborhood attribute that divides census tracts within the metropolitan area into three 
groups: low-, moderate-, and high-poverty neighborhoods. In the literature, poverty rates 
have been frequently used as an indicator to determine neighborhood opportunity in which 
neighborhoods with low-poverty rates are deemed as quality neighborhoods exhibiting 
greater access to opportunities. Especially in the MTO experiment, households in the 
experimental group were required to use their vouchers only in low-poverty neighborhoods 
with poverty rates below ten percent. To achieve the poverty-deconcentration goal, rental 
housing supply across the metropolitan area must provide MTO participants with enough 
affordable housing options in low-poverty neighborhoods, or those might be crowded out 
because of competitiveness in the market despite the use of vouchers. Therefore, I examine 
how the number of affordable housing options for low-income renters and voucher 
households differ between neighborhoods grouped by poverty rates. I define low-poverty 
neighborhoods as where poverty rate is 10 percent or less, moderate-poverty neighborhoods 
as where poverty rate is between 11 and 20 percent, and high-poverty neighborhoods as 
where poverty rate is more than 20 percent. Furthermore, I explore how the share of 
affordable housing options would change if the definition of FMR is changed to Small Area 
FMR using FY2010 hypothetical Small Area FMRs. The localized, zip-code determination of 
payment standards are expected to expand housing options in high-opportunity 
neighborhoods by allowing higher payment standards in expensive markets based on zip 
code. I use the HUD-USPS zip crosswalk file to allocate zip codes to census tracts, and 
determine the number of rental units affordable to voucher households whose rent is below 






3.2.2. Measurement of Segregation 
Segregation of affordable housing for housing voucher households is attributed to the 
disparity in rentable housing options between neighborhoods. If affordable housing options 
through housing vouchers are constrained in certain neighborhoods, neighborhood choices of 
voucher households would inevitably be limited in these neighborhoods. Several studies 
found a negative effect of Fair Market Rents (FMRs) as a limitation forcing voucher 
households into low-poverty neighborhoods because of a lack of affordable and available 
options measured as rental units below the applicable FMR (McClure 2010; 2013, McClure 
et al. 2015). I extend these studies to address whether spatial and racial aspects of segregation 
of affordable housing for voucher households exist in addition to economic segregation. I 
compare trends in segregation of affordable housing across different neighborhood 
characteristics between 2000 and 2009. Particularly, I explore how segregation of affordable 
housing would change if the definition of FMR is changed to Small Area FMR using FY2010 
hypothetical Small Area FMRs. The localized, zip-code determination of payment standards 
are expected to reduce segregation of affordable housing by evening out the share of 
affordable housing in each neighborhood across the metropolitan area.  
The most common measures of inequality are one-number-summary statistics that 
measure inequality throughout the distribution and differ somewhat in their sensitivity to 
changes in the tails versus the middle of the distribution. A popular measure in the literature 
on economic inequality is the Gini coefficient. Varying from zero to one, it measures 
deviation from a perfectly equitable distribution. Landis et al. (2002) generated the rent Gini 
coefficient to explore the effects of industrial structure on the distribution of housing 
outcomes within metropolitan areas. While the Gini coefficient has many desirable 






In the context of decomposability, Theil (1967) introduced the concept of entropy to 
the social sciences as a measure of inequality. Theil’s (1972) entropy index of segregation, 
the Information Theory index (H), has been consistently presented in the sociological 
literature as a measure of residential segregation (Reardon and Firebaugh 2002, Reardon and 
O’Sullivan 2004, White 1986), and it has become the standard for decomposition studies of 
segregation (Bischoff 2008, Farrell 2008, Fischer 2008, Fischer et al. 2004, Parisi et al. 
2011). The Theil’s H index measures the extent of evenness to which groups are evenly 
distributed across spatial units (Massey and Denton 1988), indicating how diverse 
neighborhoods are on average compared with the diversity of the entire metropolitan area.  
To depict segregation of affordable housing in the MTO metropolitan areas, Theil’s 
H index is calculated in three categories: rental units affordable to ELI renters, rental units 
with the rent below the FMR, and rental units with the rent below the Small Area FMR (2009 
only). For each category, Theil’s H index is computed using different definitions of 
affordable housing: rental units affordable to ELI renters, rental units with the rent below the 
applicable FMR, and rental units with the rent below the applicable Small Area FMR. Due to 
their zip code-based determinations, Small Area FMRs are expected to reduce segregation of 
affordable housing. Consideration of more local housing market conditions would result in 
more affordable housing options through vouchers in less segregated neighborhoods. My 
simulation of implementing Small Area FMRs instead of the current FMRs reveals to what 
extent the HUD’s newly proposed rule, designed for FMRs to vary at zip code level, 
increases the capacity of affordable housing for voucher households and expands housing 
options in less segregated neighborhoods. 
The calculation of H begins with entropy (E) which is defined as below. 











where pi refers to the share of affordable housing of a particular geographical area. 
By comparing all the Es for the subareas, census tracts, to the overall E for the large area, the 
metropolitan area, the Theil’s H index is computed, which can be interpreted as the average 
difference between Es of census tracts and the overall E, expressed as a proportion of overall 











where R is the total rental units of the metropolitan area, Rn is rental units in census 
tract n, Ej is overall entropy in metropolitan j, and En is the entropy in census tract n. Lower 
levels of segregation occurs when the level of affordable housing stock in the metropolitan 
area is similarly observed in as many as census tracts. Higher level of segregation is apparent 
when census tracts are more homogenous than their metropolitan contexts, showing that 
rental units are either affordable or not affordable. At its extremes, the index reflects that all 
census tracts have the same proportion of affordable housing (H=0), or that each census tract 
has either all rental units affordable or all rental units unaffordable (H=1). 
An essential part of this analysis is the Theil’s H is decomposition into its group 
components. Reardon et al. (2000) show that the Theil’s H can be decomposed as  







where HS is the segregation computed between subgroups, Rs is rental units in 
subgroup s, Es is the entropy in subgroup s, and Hs is the segregation computed within 
subgroup s. To address how segregation of affordable housing has changed over time in 
spatial, economic, and racial aspects, the degree of overall metropolitan segregation is 
disaggregated into (1) central city and other suburbs, (2) low-poverty neighborhoods, where 





between 11 and 20 percent, and high-poverty neighborhoods, where poverty rate is more than 
20 percent, and (3) low-percentage-white neighborhoods, where the proportion of the white is 
50 percent or less, moderate-percentage-white neighborhoods, where the proportion of the 
white is between 51 and 80 percent, and high-percentage-white neighborhoods, where the 
proportion of the white is more than 80 percent. Percentage-white represents the white self-
segregation and exclusion of affordable housing from white communities (Briggs et al. 1999, 
Polikoff 2006, South et al. 2011). 
For each split, between- and within-group components are respectively shown as the 
proportion of inequality that can only be reduced through redistributing elements in that 
component. Given that these between- and within-group components of each decomposition 
add up to the total metropolitan inequality, it is also possible to calculate the percentage of 
metropolitan inequality attributed to each element simply by dividing them by total inequality 
(Reardon and Firebaugh 2002). This is a useful way to make comparisons over time and 
across places irrespective of differences in levels of inequality.  
 
3.3. Results 
3.3.1. The Dynamics of MTO Rental Housing Markets 
I begin with an examination of the dynamics of housing markets in the Moving to 
Opportunity metropolitan areas between 2000 and 2009. Table 1 presents percentage changes 
in affordable rental units by income. The last column of the table shows that all five 
metropolitan areas decreased in the percentage of total rental units, in which Boston saw the 
greatest decline and Los Angeles saw the smallest decline. The percentage of affordable units 
to upper high-income (more than 80 percent of AMI) renters increased, while Los Angeles 
saw a decrease by 21 percent. With the exception of Los Angeles, all other areas saw a 





affordable rental units to extremely low-income (ELI) renters was the largest in Baltimore 
and Chicago. On the other hand, Boston and New York saw the smallest decrease in 
affordable rental units to VLI renters. Affordable units to ELI and VLI renters in Los Angeles 
increased by 20 and 36 percent, respectively.  
 
Table 1. Change in Rental Units by Income Needed to Make the Rent Affordable, 2000-2009 
Change 00-09 Rental units by the affordability of their rents relative to the AMI 
  0–30% of AMI 30–50% of AMI 50–80% of AMI >80% of AMI Total 
Baltimore -26.5% -23.6% 15.9% 83.7% -2.1% 
Boston -10.8% -35.5% -6.8% 36.7% -6.7% 
Chicago -31.1% -27.7% 19.8% 22.0% -4.5% 
LA 20.2% 36.3% 2.9% -21.1% -2.3% 
New York -9.9% -15.3% -12.0% 14.3% -5.4% 
 
Table 2 displays trends in the share of the affordable housing stock between 2000 and 
2009. All areas except Los Angeles saw a decrease in the total share of affordable housing to 
ELI and VLI renters. Despite the small increase in its share, Los Angeles still had the 
smallest share compared with other areas. There was a five percentage point decline in the 
shares of affordable housing to ELI renters in Baltimore and Chicago, while there was an 
eight percentage point decline in the shares of affordable housing to VLI renters in Baltimore, 
Boston, and Chicago. 
 
Table 2. Share of Affordable Housing Stock for Low-Income Renters, 2000-2009 
  Share of units by the affordability of their rents relative to the AMI 
  2000 2009 
  0–30% of AMI 30–50% of AMI 0–30% of AMI 30–50% of AMI 
Baltimore 21.3% 34.9% 16.0% 27.2% 
Boston 20.7% 26.2% 19.8% 18.1% 
Chicago 16.1% 34.3% 11.6% 26.0% 
LA 6.0% 9.2% 7.4% 12.8% 






The situation is completely different on the demand side. Table 3 shows the change 
in the number of renters in MTO metropolitan areas by income as a percentage of the AMI 
between 2000 and 2009. While the total number of renters decreased over time, the number 
of ELI and VLI renters increased in most metropolitan areas during the same period. This 
contrasts with the changes on the supply side, as there was a drastic decline in affordable 
housing stock for low-income households. Notably, Los Angeles saw the greatest increase. 
While Boston and Chicago saw a large increase in ELI renters, Baltimore and New York saw 
a large increase in VLI renters. In all metropolitan areas, there was a decrease in the number 
of renters with income higher than 80 percent of the AMI. 
 
Table 3. Change in Renters by Income Group, 2000-2009 
Change 00-09 Renters by income as a % of AMI   
  0–30% of AMI 30–50% of AMI 50–80% of AMI >80% of AMI Total 
Baltimore 2.1% 8.2% -9.6% -5.8% -2.4% 
Boston 7.5% -3.8% -21.5% -12.1% -7.3% 
Chicago 7.6% 3.8% -11.1% -13.4% -4.9% 
LA 24.5% 16.6% 4.6% -17.5% 0.7% 
New York 1.3% 5.9% -2.9% -12.1% -4.6% 
 
Table 4 shows trends in the share of renters by income group between 2000 and 
2009. All areas saw an increase in the share of ELI and VLI renters, whereas the total share 
of affordable housing to ELI and VLI renters declined during the same period (Table 2). In 
Los Angeles’s case, the share of ELI renters increased by a five percentage point. In Boston 
and Chicago, the increase in the share of ELI renters was larger than that of VLI renters.  
 
Table 4. Share of Rental Units by Income Needed to Make the Rent Affordable, 2000-2009 
  Share of renters by income as a % of AMI 
  2000 2009 
  0–30% of AMI 30–50% of AMI 0–30% of AMI 30–50% of AMI 





Boston 26.2% 15.3% 30.3% 15.9% 
Chicago 25.0% 15.9% 28.3% 17.4% 
LA 19.9% 16.1% 24.6% 18.6% 
New York 25.5% 14.2% 27.1% 15.8% 
 
Table 5 shows trends in the affordable housing gap by income group between 2000 
and 2009. For ELI renters, the affordable housing gap has exacerbated with the exception of 
Los Angeles metropolitan area. A severe mismatch exists between the number of ELI renters 
and the number of affordable units available to them. In total, only 58 affordable units exist 
for every 100 ELI renters in 2000, which decreased by 10 in 2009. In Los Angeles, the 
affordable housing gap for VLI renters somewhat improved from 2000 to 2009, although it 
still remained the lowest. With the exception of Los Angeles, more than 100 affordable units 
existed per 100 VLI renters, which was enough to provide affordable housing to every renter 
under ideally perfect allocation. 
 
Table 5. Affordable Housing Gap by Income Category, 2000-2009 
  Affordable Rental Units per 100 Renters 
  2000 2009 
  0–30% of AMI 30–50% of AMI 0–30% of AMI 30–50% of AMI 
Baltimore 90.0 229.0 64.8 161.7 
Boston 81.7 176.5 67.7 118.3 
Chicago 68.6 228.4 43.9 159.1 
LA 31.4 59.1 30.3 69.1 
New York 59.2 139.0 52.7 111.1 
Total 58.1 138.2 47.5 108.6 
 
Table 6 presents the share of rental units with rents below the FMR. Compared with 
trends in affordable housing for ELI and VLI renters, affordable housing options in the 
Housing Choice Voucher program improved during the 2000 and 2009 period. Because MTO 
metropolitan areas are large in size, there are several FMR areas that are designated. FMRs in 





voucher households more housing options. While McClure et al. (2015) showed that the 
nationwide share of units with the rent below the applicable FMR was 18 percent of all 
housing in 2010, all MTO metropolitan areas show more than 50 percent of housing 
affordable to voucher holders. During this period, all areas except for Chicago saw an 
increase in the ratio of the number of housing voucher households to the total number of 
renters. The size of the HCV program is relatively small compared to the number of renters in 
the private market, so the affordable housing gap is seldom found in the program.  
 
Table 6. Rental Units with the Rent below the Fair Market Rent, 2000-2009 
  2000 2009 
  
Share of rental 
units with the rent 
below the FMR 
Share of housing 
voucher 
households 
Share of rental 
units with the rent 
below the FMR 
Share of housing 
voucher 
households 
BAL 46.3% 4.2% 55.0% 8.9% 
BOS 60.3% 5.3% 51.6% 6.6% 
CHI 61.6% 4.1% 53.7% 2.8% 
LA 52.3% 3.9% 63.5% 5.4% 
NY 69.1% 4.2% 61.6% 7.0% 
 
3.3.2. Spatial Distribution of Affordable Housing 
The results in Section 3.3.1 show that affordable housing gaps exist in MTO metropolitan 
areas particularly for ELI renters, yet they can be concentrated in certain geographic areas. 
The spatial distribution of affordable housing is also affected by neighborhood attributes. 
Using poverty rate as a target neighborhood characteristic of the analysis, Table 7 shows 
trends in the affordable housing gap by income group and by census tract poverty rate 
between 2000 and 2009. Consistent with Table 5, the affordable housing gap has exacerbated 
in all neighborhoods with the exception of Los Angeles metropolitan area. In Los Angeles, 
the supply of housing affordable to VLI renters somewhat improved from 2000 to 2009, 





areas in New York, more than 100 affordable units existed per 100 VLI renters in all 
neighborhoods. The difference in the ratio of affordable units between low-, moderate-, and 
high-poverty neighborhoods showed different results. Deficiencies in the affordable stock to 
ELI renters were more severe in moderate-poverty neighborhoods than low-poverty 
neighborhoods. The decrease in the shortage was substantial, especially in Baltimore, Boston, 
and Chicago. The supply of affordable housing stock for ELI renters in these neighborhoods 
decreased by about 16 units per 100 renters. 
 
Table 7. Affordable Housing Gap by Income Category and Tract Poverty Rate, 2000-2009 
    Affordable Rental Units per 100 Renters 
   2000 2009 
   0–30% of AMI 30–50% of AMI 0–30% of AMI 30–50% of AMI 
BAL Poverty rate ≤ 10% 93.8 197.2 69.2 126.1 
  11% ≤ ≤ 20% 67.3 267.5 52.5 189.1 
  Poverty rate > 20% 99.9 226.8 69.9 188.3 
        
BOS Poverty rate ≤ 10% 88.1 175.4 77.7 111.7 
  11% ≤ ≤ 20% 75.9 186.6 59.2 121.6 
  Poverty rate > 20% 76.0 165.5 65.4 125.7 
        
CHI Poverty rate ≤ 10% 63.4 177.6 53.6 113.2 
  11% ≤ ≤ 20% 54.7 259.9 35.9 150.4 
  Poverty rate > 20% 76.9 264.9 44.0 206.8 
        
LA Poverty rate ≤ 10% 46.7 40.4 44.2 46.9 
  11% ≤ ≤ 20% 28.8 45.7 27.1 55.9 
  Poverty rate > 20% 27.3 71.1 27.0 94.8 
        
NY Poverty rate ≤ 10% 61.9 126.4 54.1 95.3 
  11% ≤ ≤ 20% 44.4 130.6 39.9 101.2 
  Poverty rate > 20% 63.6 150.6 58.4 130.5 
 
Table 8 shows the affordable-and-available ratios by tract poverty rate during the 
same sample period, which includes the criterion of availability in addition to affordability 





poses an important additional constraint on renters seeking affordable units. Rental markets 
are constrained for ELI renters across the five metropolitan areas despite substantial variation 
in the availability of affordable rental units. In Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York, less 
than 25 percent of ELI renters could actually find an affordable and available unit in low-
poverty neighborhoods between 2000 and 2009. The paucity of affordable and available units 
was worsened by the occupancy of a considerable proportion of the most affordable housing 
stock by renters who could afford to spend more. Subtracting numbers in Table 8 from 
numbers in Table 7, I find that higher income families occupied more than 20 units affordable 
to every 100 ELI renters in low-poverty neighborhoods in 2009. 
 
Table 8. Affordable and Available Housing Gap by Income Category and Tract Poverty Rate, 
2000-2009 
    Affordable and Available Rental Units per 100 Renters 
   2000 2009 
   0–30% of AMI 30–50% of AMI 0–30% of AMI 30–50% of AMI 
BAL Poverty rate ≤ 10% 27.7 64.0 29.1 54.9 
  11% ≤ ≤ 20% 34.2 114.9 33.3 90.4 
  Poverty rate > 20% 55.9 128.6 46.8 106.9 
        
BOS Poverty rate ≤ 10% 45.7 63.3 44.7 46.1 
  11% ≤ ≤ 20% 45.1 80.9 41.4 60.4 
  Poverty rate > 20% 51.5 89.3 50.8 75.5 
        
CHI Poverty rate ≤ 10% 24.7 61.9 22.8 45.9 
  11% ≤ ≤ 20% 24.7 113.4 18.8 70.2 
  Poverty rate > 20% 45.0 143.5 30.5 115.6 
        
LA Poverty rate ≤ 10% 15.1 16.8 20.6 23.5 
  11% ≤ ≤ 20% 13.6 23.4 15.3 33.1 
  Poverty rate > 20% 15.7 42.6 19.0 65.4 
        
NY Poverty rate ≤ 10% 24.9 49.5 23.9 42.5 
  11% ≤ ≤ 20% 22.3 60.3 23.8 51.3 






Table 9 displays the difference in affordable housing for housing voucher households 
between low-, moderate-, and high-poverty neighborhoods. Although housing affordability 
improved from 2000 and 2009, low-poverty neighborhoods had the least affordable housing 
stock for voucher holders. While Baltimore and Los Angeles had less than 27 percent of 
rental units with the rent below the FMR in 2000, all metropolitan areas displayed a 
comparable share of affordable housing units, 42 to 56 percent, in low-poverty 
neighborhoods in 2009. Boston showed the highest affordability in these neighborhoods. 
Also, in 2009, more than 30 percent of the difference in share of affordable housing between 
low- and high-poverty neighborhoods was observed in Baltimore, Los Angeles, and New 
York. 
 
Table 9. Rental Units with the Rent below the Fair Market Rent and Tract Poverty Rate, 
2000-2009 
  Share of Rental Units with the Rent below the FMR   
  2000 2009 
  
Poverty rate ≤ 
10% 11% ≤ ≤ 20% 
Poverty rate > 
20% 
Poverty rate ≤ 
10% 11% ≤ ≤ 20% 
Poverty rate > 
20% 
BAL 26.6% 52.0% 73.8% 41.7% 63.6% 72.4% 
BOS 55.3% 63.2% 69.5% 46.2% 51.6% 62.2% 
CHI 45.4% 69.3% 81.7% 47.7% 53.2% 60.7% 
LA 26.2% 47.6% 73.9% 46.4% 63.6% 80.9% 
NY 49.3% 68.3% 86.2% 44.4% 60.9% 78.7% 
 
Table 10 presents the share of affordable units for housing voucher households if the 
definition of the FMR is changed to Small Area FMR. Compared with the share of rental 
units with the rent below the FMR (Table 6), Housing voucher households in all of the MTO 
metropolitan area would have rented more units under Small Area FMRs than under the 
current FMR. Los Angeles shows an 11 percentage point incline of the share of affordable 
housing with the zip code-based payment standards (74.6 percent under Small Area FMRs 





housing across different neighborhoods would have been comparatively evened out, as the 
gain in units in high-rent zip codes cancels out a loss in units in the low-rent and moderate-
rent zip codes. Notably, the share of affordable housing would have increased by more than 
13 percentage points in low-poverty neighborhoods in Baltimore, Los Angeles, and New 
York under the applicable Small Area FMR. While the share remains constant in high-
poverty neighborhoods, the new rule would have also added more affordable housing options 
in moderate-poverty neighborhoods. 
 
Table 10. Rental Units with the Rent below the Hypothetical Small Area Fair Market Rent 
and Tract Poverty Rate, 2009 
2009 Share of Rental Units with the Rent below the SAFMR 
  Total Metropolitan Area Poverty rate ≤ 10% 11% ≤ ≤ 20% Poverty rate > 20% 
BAL 63.1%  54.7% 67.5% 74.9% 
BOS 58.2%  55.8% 56.5% 65.2% 
CHI 61.9%  50.5% 63.1% 73.4% 
LA 74.6%  68.2% 73.3% 82.7% 
NYC 70.5%   59.6% 69.5% 81.9% 
 
3.3.3. Segregation of Affordable Housing 
The previous section shows that affordable housing gaps are more severe in low- and 
moderate-poverty neighborhoods and that rental units affordable to housing voucher 
households are also more prevalent in high-poverty neighborhoods. I now turn to the 
measurement of segregation of affordability housing to address whether affordable units are 
evenly distributed across different neighborhoods in the metropolitan area. Table 11 displays 
results for Theil’s H indices by different traits of rental units. I focus on the changes in 
inequality between 2000 and 2009. The segregation of housing affordable to both ELI renters 
and housing voucher households improved in Baltimore, Chicago, and Los Angeles. In the 





improvement than those for voucher households. In Baltimore and New York, compared with 
ELI renters, voucher households faced less segregated affordable housing options in 2000, 
but had more segregated affordable housing options within the metropolitan area in 2009. On 
the other hand, in Chicago and Los Angeles, the segregation of affordable housing for 
voucher households remained the greatest throughout the period. In 2009, Baltimore showed 
the highest H index for units with the rent below the FMR (0.22), while Boston showed the 
lowest (0.12). When hypothetical Small Area FMRs are implemented, the segregation of 
housing affordable to voucher households would considerably reduce by more than 30 
percent on average, which becomes drastically lower than the segregation of housing 
affordable to ELI renters. 
 
Table 11. Theil’s Information Theory (H) index, 2000-2009 
  Theil's Information Theory (H) Index    
  2000 2009 
  
Units Affordable 
to ELI Renters 
Units with the 
Rent below the 
FMR 
Units Affordable 
to ELI Renters 
Units with the 
Rent below the 
FMR 
Units with the 
Rent below the 
SAFMR 
BAL 0.27 0.26 0.21 0.22 0.14 
BOS 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.09 
CHI 0.21 0.22 0.12 0.15 0.10 
LA 0.11 0.22 0.10 0.18 0.12 
NY 0.21 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.12 
 
Theil’ H indices are decomposed into spatial, economic, and racial aspects. Table 12 
presents decomposed Theil’s H indices from a spatial aspect. During the 2000 and 2009 
period, the segregation of affordable housing for voucher households declined in central cities 
while increasing in suburbs within Baltimore, Boston, and New York. In Chicago, ELI 
renters living in the central city faced more segregated affordable housing options than 
voucher households living in the central city, while voucher households living in the suburbs 





contrast, greater segregation of affordable housing was observed in the central city for 
voucher households and in the suburbs for ELI renters. In 2009, the central city in New York 
showed the highest H index for units with the rent below the FMR (0.23), while Boston 
showed the lowest (0.12). When hypothetical Small Area FMRs are implemented, the 
segregation of housing affordable to voucher households would reduce both in central city 
and suburbs, which becomes lower than the segregation of housing affordable to ELI renters. 
 
Table 12. Decomposition of Theil’s Information Theory (H) index, Spatial Aspect, 2000-
2009 
    Decomposition of Theil's H index, Central City 
   2000 2009 
   
Units Affordable 
to ELI Renters 
Units with the Rent 
below the FMR 
Units Affordable 
to ELI Renters 
Units with the Rent 
below the FMR 
Units with the 





Cent City 0.20 0.11 0.19 0.11 0.10 
Suburbs 0.22 0.21 0.17 0.22 0.14 
  




Cent City 0.14 0.13 0.16 0.12 0.08 
Suburbs 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.09 
  




Cent City 0.22 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.08 
Suburbs 0.18 0.22 0.10 0.16 0.13 
  
       
L
A 
Cent City 0.14 0.22 0.13 0.19 0.10 
Suburbs 0.09 0.20 0.07 0.17 0.13 
  
       
N
Y 
Cent City 0.21 0.24 0.18 0.23 0.15 
Suburbs 0.21 0.14 0.17 0.16 0.11 
 
The decomposition distinguishes between-group from within-group components of 
segregation for separate elements. Table 13 shows between-group segregation of affordable 
housing from a spatial aspect. With the exception of Baltimore, less than five percent of the 
segregation of affordable housing in terms of central city versus suburbs could be accounted 





of affordable housing in terms of central city versus suburbs could be accounted for by 
within-group segregation. The average number of affordable housing units may vary from the 
central city to suburbs, and this alone implies between-group segregation. If the number of 
affordable housing units vary inside the central city and suburbs, respectively, this accounts 
for within-group segregation. In Baltimore, between-group segregation declined by ten 
percent in housing affordable to ELI renters and by 20 percent in housing affordable to 
voucher households. In 2009, 17 percent of the total segregation in units with the rent below 
the FMR was attributable to the difference in affordability levels between central city and 
suburbs, whereas between-group segregation accounted for eight percent of the segregation 
of affordable housing in the voucher program using the Small Area FMR.  
 
Table 13. Decomposition of Theil’s Information Theory (H) index, Spatial Aspect, Between-
Group Inequality, 2000-2009 
  Between-Group Inequality, Central City   
  2000 2009 
  
Units Affordable 
to ELI Renters 
Units with the 
Rent below the 
FMR 
Units Affordable 
to ELI Renters 
Units with the 
Rent below the 
FMR 
Units with the 
Rent below the 
SAFMR 
BAL 27.9% 36.7% 17.0% 16.8% 7.7% 
BOS 1.0% 0.6% 0.7% 1.9% 0.3% 
CHI 4.0% 11.9% 0.6% 3.1% 0.2% 
LA 2.0% 5.1% 0.1% 0.9% 0.6% 
NY 0.0% 6.4% 0.0% 3.9% 1.6% 
 
Table 14 presents decomposed Theil’s H indices by census tract poverty rate. During 
the 2000 and 2009 period, the segregation of affordable housing for voucher households 
increased in low-poverty neighborhoods in Baltimore, Boston, Los Angeles, and New York. 
The segregation of affordable housing for voucher households was more severe in low-
poverty neighborhoods than high-poverty neighborhood in all MTO metropolitan areas 





households living in low-poverty neighborhoods faced more segregation affordable housing 
options than ELI renters living in such neighborhoods, while ELI renters living in high-
poverty neighborhoods had more segregated affordable housing options than voucher 
households living in these neighborhoods. Low-poverty neighborhoods in Baltimore showed 
the highest H index for the units with the rent below the FMR (0.23), while high-poverty 
neighborhoods in Chicago and Los Angeles showed the lowest (0.08). When hypothetical 
Small Area FMRs are implemented, the segregation of housing affordable to voucher 
households would reduce considerably in low-income neighborhoods, especially in Baltimore 
with a 40 percent decrease and in New York with a 31 percent decrease. 
 
Table 14. Decomposition of Theil’s Information Theory (H) index, Economic Aspect, 2000-
2009 
    Decomposition of Theil's H index, Poverty Rate 
   2000 2009 
   
Units Affordable 
to ELI Renters 
Units with the Rent 
below the FMR 
Units Affordable 
to ELI Renters 
Units with the Rent 
below the FMR 
Units with the 





Pov ≤ 10% 0.22 0.19 0.16 0.23 0.14 
11 ≤ ≤ 20% 0.15 0.13 0.16 0.10 0.08 
Pov > 20% 0.17 0.11 0.18 0.11 0.09 
 




Pov ≤ 10% 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.10 
11 ≤ ≤ 20% 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.05 
Pov > 20% 0.14 0.11 0.15 0.12 0.07 
  




Pov ≤ 10% 0.14 0.20 0.07 0.18 0.13 
11 ≤ ≤ 20% 0.11 0.11 0.07 0.11 0.07 
Pov > 20% 0.17 0.08 0.16 0.08 0.07 
  
       
L
A 
Pov ≤ 10% 0.08 0.15 0.06 0.17 0.18 
11 ≤ ≤ 20% 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.12 0.07 
Pov > 20% 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.08 0.05 
  
       
N
Y 
Pov ≤ 10% 0.14 0.15 0.12 0.18 0.12 
11 ≤ ≤ 20% 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.07 






Table 15 shows between-group segregation of affordable housing from an economic 
aspect. Between-group segregation of units with the rent below the FMR decreased between 
2000 and 2009. While Los Angeles had a higher share of between-group segregation of units 
affordable to voucher households than units affordable to ELI renters, Boston showed the 
opposite; the share of between-group segregation over the total segregation of units 
affordable to ELI renters was higher than units affordable to voucher households. In New 
York, 31 percent of the total segregation of units with a rent below the FMR was attributable 
to the difference in affordability levels between low-, moderate-, and high-poverty 
neighborhoods. In all metropolitan areas except Boston, between-group segregation was less 
likely to account for the segregation of affordable housing in the voucher program when 
hypothetical Small Area FMRs are implemented.  
 
Table 15. Decomposition of Theil’s Information Theory (H) index, Economic Aspect, 
Between-Group Inequality, 2000-2009 
  Between-Group Inequality, Poverty Rate   
  2000 2009 
  
Units Affordable 
to ELI Renters 
Units with the 
Rent below the 
FMR 
Units Affordable 
to ELI Renters 
Units with the 
Rent below the 
FMR 
Units with the 
Rent below the 
SAFMR 
BAL 38.9% 45.7% 23.4% 23.3% 15.4% 
BOS 15.8% 7.6% 13.6% 3.4% 12.4% 
CHI 36.6% 32.2% 16.7% 16.9% 8.2% 
LA 5.8% 53.5% 6.4% 30.3% 9.3% 
NY 24.1% 41.5% 25.7% 31.1% 22.4% 
 
Table 16 presents decomposed Theil’s H indices by census tract racial composition. 
During the 2000 and 2009 period, the segregation of affordable housing for voucher 
households declined in high-percentage-white neighborhoods while increasing in low-





affordable housing for voucher households were more severe in high-percentage-white 
neighborhoods than low-percentage-white neighborhood in all MTO metropolitan areas 
except Baltimore. In all MTO metropolitan areas except Los Angeles, voucher households 
living in high-percentage-white neighborhoods faced more segregated affordable housing 
options than ELI renters living in such neighborhoods, while ELI renters living in low-
percentage-white neighborhoods had more segregated affordable housing options than 
voucher households living in these neighborhoods. When hypothetical Small Area FMRs are 
implemented, the segregation of housing affordable to voucher households would 
considerably reduce in high-percentage-white neighborhoods, with the exception of Los 
Angeles where the segregation increased by 99 percent. 
 
Table 16. Decomposition of Theil’s Information Theory (H) index, Racial Aspect, Between-
Group Inequality, 2000-2009 
    Decomposition of Theil's H index, % White   
   2000 2009 
   
Units Affordable 
to ELI Renters 
Units with the Rent 
below the FMR 
Units Affordable 
to ELI Renters 
Units with the Rent 
below the FMR 
Units with the 





Whi ≤ 50% 0.24 0.16 0.24 0.21 0.11 
51 ≤ ≤ 80% 0.27 0.23 0.17 0.21 0.13 
Whi > 80% 0.15 0.21 0.15 0.20 0.16 
  




Whi ≤ 50% 0.12 0.05 0.15 0.06 0.08 
51 ≤ ≤ 80% 0.13 0.10 0.13 0.12 0.08 
Whi > 80% 0.10 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.09 
  




Whi ≤ 50% 0.19 0.07 0.14 0.08 0.08 
51 ≤ ≤ 80% 0.18 0.19 0.11 0.17 0.11 
Whi > 80% 0.12 0.18 0.07 0.16 0.13 
  
       
L
A 
Whi ≤ 50% 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.08 
51 ≤ ≤ 80% 0.09 0.16 0.05 0.15 0.16 
Whi > 80% 0.08 0.15 0.12 0.13 0.25 
  
       







51 ≤ ≤ 80% 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.16 0.11 
Whi > 80% 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.19 0.12 
 
Table 17 shows between-group segregation of affordable housing from a racial 
aspect. Between-group segregation of both units affordable to ELI renters and units 
affordable to voucher households increased between 2000 and 2009. In 2009, less than ten 
percent of the total segregation of housing affordable to ELI renters was attributable to the 
between-group difference, whereas more than 20 percent was explained by between-group 
segregation in certain metropolitan areas such as Los Angeles and New York. In all 
metropolitan areas except New York, between-group segregation of affordable housing for 
voucher households tends to decrease comparable to between-group inequality in affordable 
housing for ELI renters, if hypothetical Small Area FMRs are implemented. 
 
Table 17. Decomposition of Theil’s Information Theory (H) index, Racial Aspect, Between-
Group Inequality, 2000-2009 
  Between-Group Inequality, % White   
  2000 2009 
  
Units Affordable 
to ELI Renters 
Units with the 
Rent below the 
FMR 
Units Affordable 
to ELI Renters 
Units with the 
Rent below the 
FMR 
Units with the 
Rent below the 
SAFMR 
BAL 22.0% 25.7% 5.4% 7.9% 6.8% 
BOS 12.5% 9.5% 8.5% 8.1% 6.0% 
CHI 25.3% 33.7% 6.7% 18.4% 4.9% 
LA 3.7% 42.1% 2.3% 32.6% 4.2% 
NYC 13.7% 31.9% 9.2% 20.4% 15.0% 
 
3.4. Discussion 
During the 2000 and 2009 period, the supply of rental units affordable to low-income renters 
drastically decreased, while the number of low-income renters increased. The rental housing 
stock affordable to extremely low-income (ELI) and very low-income (VLI) renters became 





declining affordable housing stock since 2000. Relatively few rental units are affordable, and 
even fewer are available to renters with the lowest incomes, particularly in low-poverty 
neighborhoods. The supply of rental units that are affordable to extremely low-income 
households remains substantially inadequate, and this shortage is worsened by the natural 
preference of higher income renters for more affordable units. Among five MTO 
metropolitan areas, the most severe case of affordable housing gap was Los Angeles, while 
the least severe case was Boston.  
Given the scarcity of affordable and available units for the poorest renters, housing 
vouchers continues to be an important policy option for addressing the growing problem of 
unmet needs with the existing housing stock. With regard to housing vouchers, MTO 
metropolitan areas consist of more than one Fair Market Rent (FMR) area, which allows 
voucher households to have more housing options across the metropolitan area relative to 
other areas with a single FMR. However, being consistent with the literature, my findings 
suggest that housing options for voucher households are relatively concentrated in moderate- 
and high-poverty neighborhoods, because FMRs were not high enough to include expensive 
rental units in low-poverty neighborhoods. 
Affordable housing for housing voucher households was as segregated as affordable 
housing for ELI renters, or even worse in some metropolitan areas. Interestingly, the 
segregation of FMR exacerbated in low-poverty neighborhoods and high-percentage-white 
neighborhoods, while the segregation reduced in central cities. This result implies not only 
that FMRs were not effective in taking into account local rental market conditions to provide 
more housing options to voucher recipients whose income is comparable to ELI renters, but 
also that rental units with the rent below the applicable FMR are likely to cluster in certain 
low-poverty neighborhoods and high-percentage-white neighborhoods rather than being 





in terms of local market conditions, expansion of housing options through vouchers might be 
concentrated in certain areas, which results in greater segregation in affordable housing for 
voucher households. However, my findings on Small Area FMRs show that the zip code-
based payment standard would greatly reduce the segregation of affordable housing and 
provide voucher recipients with more evenly distributed affordable units across the 
metropolitan area. 
Regarding the importance of metropolitan rental markets, several findings are 
noteworthy. Los Angeles’s severe shortage of affordable housing has particularly affected 
low-income renters negatively. While both supply and demand have increased, the affordable 
housing gap for ELI and VLI renters was the most severe. The affordable housing gap is also 
severe in Chicago and New York. Less than 55 affordable units exist for every 100 ELI 
renters in 2009. Housing vouchers would help these households to increase the set of 
affordable housing options, although mostly in high-poverty neighborhoods. These large 
markets have had steady or rising demand during the housing boom and bust, and have 
experienced consistent rising rents over time (Ellen and Karfunkel 2016). Regulatory 
constraints in building multifamily properties and limited developable land tend to hinder 
rental housing stock growth and contribute to rising rents. Boston and Baltimore also showed 
some levels of housing unaffordability to low-income households, but comparably less so 







Chapter 4: Social Networks and Residential Mobility 
 
This chapter analyzes the impact of social networks on residential mobility. Despite extensive 
evidence on the link between low-income households’ strong social ties and residential 
mobility, there is a paucity of work that investigates whether households tend to live closer to 
relatives and friends for companionship or emotional support, or for essential practical help 
such as childcare or a ride to work. If households stay close by their social networks for 
costly services and are bound to their original neighborhoods, providing more access to social 
services might lead them to move to high-opportunity neighborhoods. I explore the pattern of 
neighborhood mobility in terms of the probability of moving back to a baseline neighborhood 
by MTO treatment groups and by race and ethnicity, and estimate logit models to examine 
how kinship/friendship and social resources in the place that households left behind influence 
subsequent mobility behaviors, particularly a move towards the baseline neighborhood.  
 
4.1. Background 
4.1.1. The Role of Social Networks in Residential Mobility 
Residential mobility is generally viewed as a way to bridge the gap between one’s desired 
housing bundle and the actual housing bundle they consume. When current living 
arrangements become non-optimal, households make a decision to move. Adjustment costs 
and other losses of moving sometimes deter mobility despite such disequilibrium. The 
decision of whether to move can be seen as weighing satisfaction with current housing 
relative to the anticipated satisfaction with alternatives (Speare 1970, Speare 1974). Changes 
in the relative attractiveness of alternative locations act as push and pull factors that motivate 





push and pull factors determines if, when, and where a household moves, and are subject to 
various constraints on or barriers to mobility. Residential mobility is also viewed from a life-
course perspective in that life events such as marriage or divorce; birth of children; children 
leaving home or attending college; change of employer, income, or assets; and retirement are 
potential causes of mobility (Clark 2005, Clark and Withers 1999). 
Households may feel attracted to other housing units or neighborhoods for a variety 
of reasons including housing quality, physical environments, and school quality, which often 
work as pull factors to consider relocation. Issues such as aging units, neighborhood safety, 
and crime, on the other hand, force households to move. At the same time, households are 
reluctant to move because of their attachment to their current residence and relationships that 
would be disrupted by the move. In the literature, scholars have focused on differentiating 
triggers of residential mobility. Coulton et al (2012) anticipated that some households may 
make positive moves to better housing or neighborhoods, while some may move due to 
changes in family composition or economic insecurity. Furthermore, some households that 
stayed may be satisfied with their house and neighborhood, but others may be dissatisfied but 
unable to move due to barriers.  
People often make mobility decisions within the context of social relations. 
Granovetter (1973), an influential study on the value of far-flung acquaintanceships, 
emphasizes the strength of weak ties that tend to link members of different social groups. In 
the neighborhood context, socialization is one of the primary function of a neighborhood 
(Hunter 1974). Weak ties among neighbors centered on the residential neighborhood can be 
effective and useful in accomplishing shared goals such as keeping the streets safe or keeping 
an eye on local children (Sampson 1999, Sampson et al. 1997). Such intra-neighborhood 





therefore difficult to replicate in new surroundings because of its ties to the neighborhood 
(DaVanzo 1981).  
In general, social networks uniquely shape the informational context of decision 
making that affects the perception of neighborhoods. Galster and Killen (1995) 
conceptualized the role of local social networks in the geography of opportunity that filters 
information and guides individuals to form subjective perceptions of elements of the 
opportunity structure such as education, labor market, and social welfare. The resources 
provided through these networks can be described as a form of ‘location-specific social 
capital’ which may enable families to depend on their networks regarding in-kind services or 
job searches (Briggs 1998, Granovetter 1995). Kinship and friendship available within 
neighborhoods are more likely accessible to families seeking social networks. In particular, 
there is strong evidence that the social ties of blacks tend to be very kin-centered and more 
local than those of Whites, and there is some evidence of the same pattern among Hispanics 
(Fischer 1982, Menjivar 1995, Oliver 1988).  
Social ties for low-income families are particularly distinctive. On average, the 
poor’s social ties are not only more localized, but also more drained than those of middle- and 
upper-income people (Fischer 1982, Kadushin and Jones 1992). In contrast to the strength of 
weak ties suggested by Granovetter (1973), Briggs et al. (2010) referred to social networks of 
low-income households as the “weakness of strong ties”, based on Stack (1974)’s findings on 
a dysfunctional “culture of poverty” among the persistently poor. Strong social ties may 
provide emotional and practical support, but they typically come with enormous obligations 
as well. Stack (1974) argued that the survival of poor families demands the sacrifice of 
upward mobility and neighborhood mobility, and obligations to kin can be draining because 





This evidence suggests that staying close to kinship or friendship is central to the lives of 
many poor families for positive, negative, and mixed reasons. 
Results of previous studies on the link between social networks and residential 
mobility vary depending on different aspects of social ties. The presence of relatives or 
friends is an important factor when mobility intentions are deterred (Speare 1974, Myers 
2000, Oh 2003). Similar results are found in Landale and Guest (1985) in that no friends in 
the neighborhood is positively associated with the decision to move. On the other hand, 
Connerly (1986) provided counterintuitive findings: neighborhood-level social ties do not 
inhibit mobility despite its little impact, compared to magnitudes of other measures such as 
age, tenure, and perceived housing and neighborhood quality. Although results are somewhat 
mixed, most studies support the importance of social networks regarding residential location 
choices.  
  
4.1.2. Mobility Outcomes of Housing Voucher Recipients 
Frequent mobility of low-income households can sometimes be viewed as a sign of housing 
instability and insecurity because of problems with landlords, creditors, or housing 
conditions. In a study of the housing careers of low-income families, participants described a 
high proportion of moves as being forced moves (Skobba 2008). Renters with children may 
also be frequent movers whose moves are a response to financial stress or problems in their 
rental housing arrangements (Coulton et al. 2012). Such involuntary moves bring concern 
that low-income households’ moves resulted from unstable housing arrangements may have 
negative consequences. For example, regular moving during childhood weakens educational 
attainment (Wood et al. 1993). Similarly, in many cases staying in the existing neighborhood 
may reflect that a family lacks the resources to move to better housing or to a desirable 





its home and neighborhood surroundings. In several studies regarding historical trends of 
residential mobility in urban poverty areas, minority households with lower-income tend to 
remain in high-poverty neighborhoods regardless of mobility intentions (Gramlich et al. 
1992, South et al. 2005). Race often functions as structural barriers in residential mobility. 
Blacks are more likely to regularly use social resources thus resistant to relocate than any 
other ethnic group (Spilimbergo and Ubeda 2004, Krysan 2008). 
On the other hand, the mobility of low-income households that receive housing 
assistance has been mainly deterred by strong social ties. Several studies regarding housing 
vouchers explains mobility patterns focusing on social networks. Varady and Walker (2000) 
reported that more than half of the residents vouchered out of HUD projects in four cities had 
very weak attachments to their new neighborhoods and reported that they would like to move 
again soon. Varady and Walker (2007) found that major factors determining location choices 
of housing voucher holders are proximity to friends and relatives and the availability of 
public transportation. Among “leased-up” voucher recipients, those who moved close 
proximity to their old neighborhoods were more satisfied, maintaining local ties with friends 
and relatives (Varady et al. 2001). These studies suggest that the possibility of maintaining 
the existing social connections may play a key role in considering a move, relocating, and 
improving housing and neighborhood satisfaction for voucher households, unless they 
completely replace the old social ties with new ones in the following neighborhood. 
The poverty-dispersal housing program such as the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) 
demonstration expected participants to relocate to quality neighborhoods and form 
relationships with their higher-income neighbors, thus building the bridging social networks 
that leverage information used to access employment and other resources to improve one’s 
financial self-sufficiency (Curley 2009). However, Cove et al. (2008) found that a few MTO 





formed limited relationships with their new neighbors, reducing the potential positive effect 
of relocation on the development of more useful job networks. Rather, some MTO movers 
lost access to useful social resources as a result of their moves to low-poverty neighborhoods. 
Findings come from the MTO experiment show that social networks persisted at the 
core of most participants’ lives regardless of relocation, and influenced how they structured 
their daily lives. The MTO Interim Evaluation (Orr et al. 2003) found that a few of MTO 
participants who moved to low-poverty neighborhoods reported having ties to more educated, 
higher income people living nearby, while many reported regular contact with the poor 
neighborhoods they had supposedly left behind. Briggs et al. (2010) identified the major 
types of neighborhood mobility and social relations, focusing on those in the experimental 
group who relocated to a low-poverty neighborhood. The most common pattern is that 
households moved to neighborhoods where relatives (kin) lived that played a central role in 
daily life, providing companionship and vital practical supports such as childcare. Some 
households were transplanted into a new neighborhood while weakening social ties to the 
place behind. Some households moved to a new neighborhood by putting distance between 
themselves and their constantly needy relatives or friends. The other very uncommon type of 
households chose to be socially isolated after relocation. Although these patterns well explain 
the link between social networks and neighborhood mobility, little attention was paid to how 
kinship/friendship and social resources have different impacts on low-income households’ 
mobility towards their initial neighborhoods. 
Access to social resources might play an important role in the residential mobility of 
low-income families. Although localized, kin-centered social networks can be often draining 
to the poor with obligations, at the same time social ties benefit low-income families in terms 
of pooling resources to share costs of social services, which may take excessive time to re-





families, the effect of social connections on residential mobility is relatively more ‘binding’ 
among low-income families due to their dependence on informal social networks for the 
provision of social services. A qualitative study of the housing careers of very low-income 
families by Skobba and Goetz (2013) also found that forced relocation out of the existing 
neighborhood and into high-opportunity neighborhoods is insensitive to social resources that 
are necessary to maintain a daily life. Nevertheless, the provision of social services has been 
overlooked in policy discussions that link social resources to residential mobility. If 
households have access to social services in a neighborhood, they may not need to close 
proximity to social ties for costly services. No studies have examined the joint effects of 
social resources and access to neighborhood-level social services on the pattern of residential 
mobility of low-income households receiving housing assistance. 
 
4.2. Residential Mobility Models 
4.2.1. Descriptive Metrics of Neighborhood Mobility 
To address the propensity for moving back to the baseline neighborhood, I explore various 
descriptive metrics of neighborhood mobility with regard to the baseline neighborhood. The 
baseline neighborhood refers to the neighborhood in which MTO households lived upon 
participation to the demonstration. Drawing upon data from the MTO spell database and 
Census TIGER shapefiles, I track all participants in the baseline survey from random 
assignment until they exit from the program or until the final survey was conducted. The 
MTO data includes a residential spell file that identifies the duration of time (in days) that 
households reside in different residential locations. I focus on whether MTO participants 
leave their baseline neighborhoods, and whether they come back to their baseline 
neighborhoods or closer proximity to such neighborhoods once they left. For those who left 





household moved elsewhere and re-entered the baseline neighborhood, (2) the household 
moved to one of adjacent the neighborhoods that surround the baseline neighborhood, and (3) 
the household moved to a neighborhood other than the baseline neighborhood or its nearby 
neighborhoods. Each pattern is repeatedly grouped into whether the household stayed in or 
exited from the current neighborhood. All neighborhoods are defined in terms of census 
tracts, and all segments are presented as percentages of the total sample size. I also identify 
the median duration of time in days that households reside in different residential locations. 
 The metrics of neighborhood mobility are separately examined by MTO treatment 
group and race/ethnicity. The MTO treatment involves random assignment to different 
groups which receive different types of housing subsidies and different geographic 
requirements for the use of the subsidy. Previous studies found that a certain degree of racial 
difference exists regarding the link between the use of social networks and the frequency of 
residential relocation (Spilimbergo and Ubeda 2004, Krysan 2008). In this sense, I compare 
the influences of these policy impacts on neighborhood mobility over time relative to race 
and ethnicity.  
 
4.2.2. Logit Models 
Previous studies extensively use logistic regressions to examine the link between social 
networks and mobility decisions. I employ logit models to describe residential mobility of 
Moving to Opportunity (MTO) households after their initial random assignment, in particular 
for the first two moves. One dependent variable is an indicator of the first move, which 
equals to one if the household moved from the first residence at the time of the baseline 
survey. The other dependent variable addresses the second move, which equals to one if the 
household moved from the second residence. The universe of this variable is those who 





and those relocated within the baseline neighborhood. Since the purpose of the second move 
analysis is to explore the impact of initial social networks on mobility towards an initial 
neighborhood, I also excluded households who made the second move after spending more 
than three years in a second neighborhood. I assume that the longer duration of residency 
implies stable settlement in a place other than the baseline neighborhood. 
Relying on this variable specification, I also employ multinomial logit regressions to 
examine the propensity for mobility of moving back to the baseline neighborhood over the 
propensity for mobility of moving far away for the baseline neighborhood. Since deciding 
whether to move or stay and deciding where to move are two distinctive behaviors, I conduct 
separate analyses that explore multiple alternatives in terms of mobility decisions. 
Establishment of the dependent variable is drawn from mobility patterns, defined in mobility 
distance categories in a descriptive analysis of neighborhood mobility. Two models with 
respect to the first move and second move are estimated respectively. For the first move 
model, the dependent variable is defined by the distance to the initial neighborhood: (1) the 
household moved within the baseline neighborhood, (2) the household moved to one of the 
adjacent neighborhoods that surround the baseline neighborhood, and (3) the household 
moved to a neighborhood other than the baseline neighborhood or its nearby neighborhoods. 
For the second move model, the dependent variable is determined similarly: (1) the 
household moved back to the baseline neighborhood, (2) the household moved to one of the 
adjacent neighborhoods that surround the baseline neighborhood, and (3) the household 
moved to a neighborhood other than the baseline neighborhood or its nearby neighborhoods. 
Alternatives in these models do not depend on each other and do not act as substitutes, which 






The estimation of each dependent variable is a function of (1) MTO treatment effects, 
(2) metropolitan controls, (3) household characteristics, (4) neighborhood characteristics, and 
(5) measures of social networks that decompose into kinship/friendship and social resources. 









where P is the probability of Y occurring, e is the natural logarithm base, X is a vector 
of social networks variables, and Z is a vector of household and neighborhood-level 
determinants of residential mobility. Dependent variable Yt=1 is whether one moved from the 
first residence, and Yt=2 is whether one moved from the second residence. In light of the 
dynamic effects of social networks, the duration of residency in the second neighborhood 
(Xt=2) is included in the logit model regarding the second move (Yt=2), while social networks 
variables in the first neighborhood (Xt=1) are also included to distinguish the effects of new 
social ties following relocation from previous social ties prior to mobility. Since social 
networks information is not available for the household’s subsequent residential locations, the 
duration of time in days until a household moves to another neighborhood is included as an 
indirect proxy of social networks to tease out the effect of lagged measures of social networks 
as a pull factor on their second move. Similarly, the multinomial logit regression models can 













where P is the probability of Y occurring, e is the natural logarithm base, X is a vector 
of social networks variables, and Z is a vector of household and neighborhood-level 
determinants of residential mobility. 
All variables employed in the analysis are described in detail in Table 18. 
 
Table 18. Variable Descriptions for the Logit and Multinomial Logit Regression Analyses 
 
Variable Definition 
     
Dependent variables  
 First move 1=moved from the first residence 
  Within baseline neighborhood 1=moved within the baseline neighborhood 
  Adjacent neighborhood 
1=moved to an adjacent neighborhood to the baseline 
neighborhood 
  Another neighborhood 1=moved to another neighborhood 
 Second move 1=moved from the second residence 
  Baseline neighborhood 1=moved back to a baseline neighborhood 
  Adjacent neighborhood 
1=moved to an adjacent neighborhood to the baseline 
neighborhood 
  Another neighborhood 1=moved to another neighborhood 
     
Independent variables  
 Treatment effects  
  Experimental group 1=Experiment group 
  Section 8 group 1=Section 8 group 
     
 Metro controls  
  Baltimore 1=lived in Baltimore 
  Boston 1=lived in Boston 
  Los Angeles 1=lived in Los Angeles 
  New York 1=lived in New York 
     
 Household characteristics  
  Vehicle access 1=the household owned a car, van, or truck that runs 
  Income household income 
  # children in HH # children in the household 
  Age of HH head age of the household head 





  HH head Hispanic 1=household head is Hispanic 
  HH head female 1=household head is female 
  HH head married 1=household head is married 
  HH head has high school degree 1=household head has high school degree or GED 
  HH head employed 1=household head is employed 
     
 Census tract characteristics  
  Poverty rate Poverty rate 
  % White % Non-Hispanic White population 
  Distance to central city Distance to central city (miles) 
  
% Housing affordable to housing 
voucher HHs % Rental units with the rent below the FMR 
  Social services density 
# jobs in NAICS sector 62 (Health Care and Social 
Assistance) divided by area 
     
 Social networks  
  
Friends in a baseline 
neighborhood 1=HH has friend(s) living in the same neighborhood 
  
Family members in a baseline 
neighborhood 
1=HH has family member(s) living in the same 
neighborhood 
  
Social resources in a baseline 
neighborhood 
Standardized score based on item-response model 
estimation of social resources 
  
Duration of residency (2nd move 
model only) Length of stay in residence prior to move 
          
 
All household-level data comes from the MTO baseline survey. Experimental and 
Section 8 groups are included to compare the influences of these policy groups on mobility 
behavior relative to a household’s level of social networks. An indicator of the household’s 
metro location is also included, with Chicago omitted as the reference category. Household 
characteristics include vehicle access, income, and the number of children in the household. 
The measure of vehicle access is equal to one if anyone in the household owned a car, van, or 
truck that runs. Characteristics of the household head include age, race and ethnicity, gender, 
marital status, education, and employment status. I also include measures of neighborhood-
level affordable housing, poverty rate, racial composition, and distance to central city from 





Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) to capture observable neighborhood characteristics 
that are associated with social networks and mobility behavior.  
I consider two dimensions of social networks that consist of kinship/friendship and 
social resources. In empirical studies of residential mobility, various measures of 
neighborhood-level social networks have been employed. In early studies, duration of 
residency is included as an indirect proxy of social networks, assuming that time allows 
residents to develop meaningful social relationships (Lansing and Mueller 1967, Speare 
1970). Several studies employed direct measures of social networks in the format of presence 
of relatives and friends (Myers 2000), number or percentage of relatives and friends (Landale 
and Guest 1985), and frequency of neighbors’ visit (Connerly 1986). The presence of friends 
and family members is a popular measurement of kinship/friendship, which assumes that 
strong social ties exist when living in the same neighborhood with friends and family 
members. On the other hand, Dawkins (2006) employed measures of social resources as well 
as social networks. Social resources capture a different aspect of social networks. Provided 
that kinship/friendship represents the density of local social networks, social resources 
measure how such networks would actually benefit the household. Separating social 
resources from kinship/friendship enables estimation models to tease out the effect of 
dependence of social networks for the provision of costly services such as day-care, 
transportation, and recreation. If there is a significant effect of social resources on a 
probability of moving within or back to an initial neighborhood, policy could intervene in 
providing social services to low-income households so that they can move to quality 
neighborhoods.  
Kinship and friendship is defined as the presence of family member(s) living in the 
same neighborhood and the presence of friend(s) living in the same neighborhood, 





estimated from the Item Response Theory (IRT) model. Social resources cannot be measured 
directly due to its unobservable characteristics, but can by quantified by a collection of 
question responses in the MTO survey that is designed to measure a household’s level of the 
latent trait. In social networks research, for example, Sampson et al. (1997) measured social 
cohesion and informal social control that were represented by a range of conceptually related 
questions. Consistent with the literature, the social resources score is estimated by three 
questions. These questions were asked to obtain binary responses regarding whether a 
household borrows things from a neighbor, whether a household rides with neighbors or 
carpool, and whether a household receives childcare from a relative or neighbor. I used a 
simple one-parameter logistic model (1PL) and predicted the score based on the estimation 
result. The other benefit of using the IRT estimation is that any household responding to at 
least one question can provide data. The IRT model takes into account the number and 
difficulty of the questions to which each household responded, and estimates one parameter 
to measure a representative value for all households. Table 19 displays a description of the 
variables that were used in the IRT estimation of social resources. Those without observation 
in these variables obtained data of a predicted estimation score through the IRT model, which 
allowed my analyses to include 4,580 households with the social resources score that varies 
from zero to one. The higher the score, the more dependence on social networks for costly 
services such as childcare and transportation. 
 
Table 19. Description of Social Resources Score 
Variables to estimate social resources score      
 Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Borrow things from a neighbor 4,580 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Ride or carpool when commute 1,224 0.03 0.18 0 1 






As briefly explained above, due to the data limitation of self-evaluated social 
networks in MTO participants’ second neighborhoods, the second move model includes the 
duration of time in years until a household moves to a different residential location in 
addition to two dimensions of social networks. The duration of residency is deemed to be an 
indirect proxy of social networks, as suggested in the literature (Lansing and Mueller 1967, 
Speare 1970).  
 
4.3. Results 
4.3.1. The Pattern of Neighborhood Mobility 
I begin with a descriptive analysis of the dynamics of neighborhood mobility, comparing the 
differences in mobility patterns between MTO treatment groups and between race and 
ethnicity. This analysis shows the extent to which MTO participants are bound to their initial 







Table 20. Descriptive Analysis of Neighborhood Mobility, MTO Participants 
        Treatment Group Race/Ethnicity 
    
Total 










Sample Size 4,594 1,812 1,348 1,434 119 2844 189 1439 
               
Percentage who have consistently stayed in a baseline neighborhood 15.2% 11.6% 13.3% 21.4% 20.2% 10.8% 21.2% 22.5% 
  Percentage who have never moved 11.6% 9.4% 9.9% 16.0% 11.8% 8.5% 13.8% 17.3% 
  Percentage who have moved within the baseline neighborhood 3.6% 2.2% 3.4% 5.4% 8.4% 2.3% 7.4% 5.2% 
               
Percentage who left a baseline neighborhood 84.8% 88.4% 86.7% 78.6% 79.8% 89.2% 78.8% 77.5% 
  Percentage who re-entered the baseline neighborhood 7.1% 6.3% 6.9% 8.4% 5.9% 7.6% 8.5% 6.2% 
   Percentage who have stayed in the baseline neighborhood after re-entering 3.3% 2.7% 2.8% 4.5% 3.4% 3.0% 5.8% 3.6% 
   Percentage who re-exited the baseline neighborhood 3.8% 3.6% 4.1% 3.8% 2.5% 4.6% 2.6% 2.6% 
   Median duration in another neighborhoods before re-entering the baseline neighborhood (days) 1,126 1,088 896 1,389 1,014 1,126 1,067 1,159 
               
  Percentage who entered an adjacent neighborhood to the baseline neighborhood 8.2% 7.6% 7.8% 9.5% 14.3% 8.5% 5.3% 7.6% 
   Percentage who have stayed in an adjacent neighborhood to the baseline neighborhood 4.5% 4.5% 4.2% 5.0% 8.4% 4.5% 1.6% 4.8% 
   Percentage who exited and moved to a neighborhood far from the baseline neighborhood 3.7% 3.1% 3.6% 4.5% 5.9% 4.1% 3.7% 2.8% 
   Median duration in another neighborhoods before entering this neighborhood (days) 0 542 0 0 0 0 633 0 
               
  Percentage who moved to a neighborhood far from the baseline neighborhood 69.2% 74.2% 72.0% 60.3% 58.8% 72.8% 64.6% 63.5% 
   Percentage who have stayed within the metropolitan area 56.7% 61.5% 58.7% 49.0% 46.2% 61.8% 54.5% 47.8% 





About 22 percent of the total MTO baseline sample has consistently stayed in a 
baseline neighborhood (15 percent), or re-entered a baseline neighborhood after the initial 
move out (seven percent). About 15 percent of the total sample has consistently stayed in the 
baseline neighborhood, while 12 percent has never moved and 4 percent has moved only 
within the baseline neighborhood. The majority of those who left the baseline neighborhood 
moved to a neighborhood far from the baseline neighborhood. About 15 percent of the total 
sample moved to a neighborhood nearby the baseline neighborhood, or re-entered the 
baseline neighborhood. For those who moved to one of the adjacent neighborhoods that 
surround the baseline neighborhood, the median duration in another neighborhood before 
entering the current one is zero, which implies that at least a half of such households made 
their first move from the baseline neighborhood to an adjacent neighborhood to the baseline 
neighborhood. The median household who re-entered the baseline neighborhoods spent 1,126 
days (3.1 years) in another neighborhood(s) before re-entering.  
About 18 percent of the experimental households have stayed in (12 percent) or re-
entered (six percent) a baseline neighborhood, whereas 30 percent of the control households 
have stayed in or re-entered a baseline neighborhood. About 9 percent of the experimental 
households and 10 percent of Section 8 households have never moved, while 16 percent of 
the control households have never moved. The lowest share of households re-entered the 
baseline neighborhood within experimental households. The median duration in another 
neighborhood before entering an adjacent neighborhood to the baseline neighborhood was 
542 days for experimental households, whereas Section 8 households and the control 
households showed zero.  
Contrary to previous studies, non-Hispanic black households showed the lowest 
percentage of staying in or re-entering a baseline neighborhood (18 percent), compared with 





(29 percent). Almost 90 percent of black households left the baseline neighborhood, but only 
16 percent of the black moved back to the baseline neighborhood or its adjacent 
neighborhoods. For white households, only 6 percent re-entered the baseline neighborhood, 
which is the lowest among race and ethnicity groups. However, 14 percent of the Whites 
moved to one of the adjacent neighborhoods that surround the baseline neighborhood, which 
is highest among race and ethnicity groups. 
 
4.3.2. Logistic Regression Results 
Table 21 presents descriptive statistics for variables used in both logit and multinomial logit 
regressions. Note that in the second move model, MTO participants who stayed in the 
baseline neighborhood and who moved to a third neighborhood after spending more than 
three years in a second neighborhood are excluded. About eight percent of the sample moved 
within a baseline neighborhood with their first move, and about five percent of the sample 
moved back to the baseline neighborhood with their second move. The households were 
somewhat unevenly divided between the experimental group (39 percent), the Section 8 
group (29 percent), and the control group (32 percent). MTO households were predominantly 
unmarried, non-working women with an average of between two and three children, an 
average income less than $10,000, and without access to vehicle. About 63 percent of the 
householders were black, and 31 percent were Hispanic. Comparing the census tract 
characteristics between the first and second neighborhoods of MTO participants, I find that 
after the first move households are likely to live in neighborhoods with lower poverty rates, 
higher percentage-white population, longer distance to central city, less affordable housing 
options for housing voucher households, and a lower social services job density. At the time 
the baseline survey was conducted, about 60 percent of the total MTO participants had 





members living in the same neighborhood. The average social resources score estimated from 
the Item Response Theory (IRT) model was 0.81, which implies that most MTO participants 
depend on social networks for social services. On average, the sample of the second move 
model spent nearly five years in the second neighborhood. 
 
Table 21. Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in the Logit and Multinomial Logit 
Regression Analyses, MTO Baseline Survey 
Variable Description Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Dependent Variable      
  First Move       
   Not Moved 0.12 0.32 0 1 
   Moved to      
    Same Neighborhood 0.08 0.27 0 1 
    Adjacent Neighborhood 0.06 0.23 0 1 
    Another Neighborhood 0.75 0.43 0 1 
  Second Move      
   Not Moved 0.41 0.49 0 1 
   Moved to      
    Baseline Neighborhood 0.05 0.23 0 1 
    Adjacent to Baseline Neighborhood 0.02 0.16 0 1 
    Another Neighborhood 0.51 0.50 0 1 
           
Independent Variable      
   Treatment effects      
    Experimental group 0.39 0.49 0 1 
    Section 8 group 0.29 0.46 0 1 
   Metro controls      
    Baltimore 0.14 0.35 0 1 
    Boston 0.21 0.41 0 1 
    Los Angeles 0.22 0.42 0 1 
    New York 0.23 0.42 0 1 
   Household characteristics      
    Vehicle Access 0.18 0.39 0 1 
    Income 9,292.49 5,501.66 2 133,333 
    Age of HH head 33.68 9.37 17 87 
    HH head Black 0.63 0.48 0 1 
    HH head Hispanic 0.31 0.46 0 1 
    HH head female 0.93 0.25 0 1 





    # children in HH 2.86 1.64 0 15 
    HH head has high school degree 0.59 0.49 0 1 
    HH head employed 0.27 0.45 0 1 
   Neighborhood characteristics      
    First Neighborhood      
     Poverty rate 0.49 0.15 0 1 
     % White 0.10 0.21 0 1 
     Distance to central city (mile) 4.10 2.83 0 19 
     % Rental units with the rent below the FMR 0.89 0.15 0 1 
     Social services jobs per 100 persons 11.25 54.85 0 2,200 
    Second Neighborhood      
     Poverty rate 0.27 0.15 0 1 
     % White 0.20 0.27 0 1 
     Distance to central city (mile) 6.87 5.59 0 55 
     % Rental units with the rent below the FMR 0.74 0.19 0 1 
     Social services jobs per 100 persons 6.96 33.47 0 564 
   Social Networks      
    Friend(s) living in a baseline neighborhood 0.60 0.49 0 1 
    Family member(s) living in a baseline neighborhood 0.36 0.48 0 1 
    Social resources in a baseline neighborhood 0.81 0.18 0 1 
      Duration of residency in a second neighborhood 4.67 4.54 0 15 
 
Table 22 displays descriptive statistics for the social networks variable by the 
dependent variable. Households that moved within or moved back to a baseline neighborhood 
are more likely to have friends and family members living in the baseline neighborhood than 
those that moved to an adjacent neighborhood to the baseline neighborhood and those that 
moved to another neighborhood. On average, those moved to one of the adjacent 
neighborhoods that surround the baseline neighborhood had a higher mean value in the 
presence of friends and family members than those that moved to another neighborhood. 
While those that moved or not moved in the sample of the first move model showed 
comparable social resources scores, those that moved back to the baseline neighborhood in 






Table 22. Descriptive Statistics for Social Networks Variables 
      Social Networks Duration of 
Residency in 
Second 





First Move      
  Not Moved 0.59 0.32 0.81 - 
  Moved to      
   Same Neighborhood 0.65 0.40 0.81 - 
   Adjacent Neighborhood 0.61 0.39 0.83 - 
   Another Neighborhood 0.59 0.36 0.80 - 
Second Move      
  Not Moved 0.58 0.37 0.82 9.18 
  Moved to      
   Baseline Neighborhood 0.73 0.51 0.82 1.44 
   Adjacent to Baseline Neighborhood 0.67 0.44 0.80 1.70 
    Another Neighborhood 0.59 0.36 0.79 1.62 
 
Table 23 reports the logit coefficients from the first move and second move models. 
The goodness of fit for the first move model is somewhat low, but comparable with other 
studies of residential mobility (Dawkins 2006, Oh 2003). Given that many households stayed 
more than three years in a second neighborhood and excluded as first moved within a 
baseline neighborhood, the sample size for the second move model is smaller than the first 
move model. Despite the smaller sample size, the goodness of fit is much higher for the 
second move model.  
 
Table 23. Logit Results of the First Move and Second Move Models 
Variable 
First Move, 
Coefficient   
Second Move, 
Coefficient 
Treatment Effects     
  Experimental group 0.697***  0.961*** 
  Section 8 group 0.884***  1.067*** 
   
 
   
Metro Controls    
  Baltimore -0.098  0.387 





  LA -1.333***  -1.113** 
  NYC -2.452***  -2.030*** 
   
 
   
Household Characteristics    
  Vehicle Access 0.110  0.475 
  Income -0.000  -0.000 
  Age of HH head -0.050***  -0.032** 
  HH head Black 0.303  0.328 
  HH head Hispanic 0.159  0.471 
  HH head female 0.149  0.613 
  HH head married 0.252  0.610 
  # children in HH 0.031  0.068 
  HH head has high school degree 0.014  0.599** 
  HH head employed -0.041  -0.355 
   
 
   
Neighborhood Characteristics    
  Poverty rate -0.909  -2.081 
  % White 0.482  -0.149 
  Distance to central city (mile) 0.002  -0.003 
  % Rental units with the rent below the FMR -0.831  0.024 
  Social services jobs per 100 persons -0.002**  0.004 
   
 
   
Social Networks    
  Friend(s) living in a baseline neighborhood -0.065  -0.043 
  Family member(s) living in a baseline neighborhood 0.051  -0.076 
  Social resources in a baseline neighborhood 0.057  -0.088 
  Duration of residency in a second neighborhood -  -2.256
*** 
       
constant 5.522***  8.018*** 
       
Number of observations 4,014  1,825 
Wald chi-square 372.42***  227.21*** 
Pseudo R2 0.165   0.818 
 
Regarding the effect of various covariates, results from both models show that those 
in the experimental and Section 8 groups show higher probabilities of moving, compared 
with the control group. Households in the Section 8 group are slightly more likely to move 
than those in the experimental group. For metropolitan controls, those in Boston, Los Angles, 
and New York are less likely to move compared to the omitted metropolitan area (Chicago). 





model, only age of household head is nonlinearly associated with the likelihood of moving. In 
the second move model, young households with higher educational attainment are more 
likely to move. Consistent with Dawkins et al. (2015), Vehicle access has a positive impact 
on mobility, although its effect is not statistically significant. Only one census tract 
characteristic is shown to be statistically associated with the likelihood of moving. In the first 
move model, those living in a lower social services job density are more likely to move. 
Surprisingly, none of social networks variables are statistically associated with residential 
mobility, except duration of residency in the second move model. Those that spent less time 
in the current neighborhood are more likely to move to a new neighborhood. 
Table 24 and Table 25 examine models estimated separately for each MTO treatment 
group and for households by race and ethnicity. Note that all Hispanic households in 
Baltimore moved from the baseline neighborhood and were excluded from the analysis. 
Several findings related to neighborhood characteristics emerge from these models. I find that 
when separate models are estimated for each treatment group, the impact of poverty rate is 
significant and negative for the control group sample in the first move model, while it is 
significant and negative for the experimental group sample in the second move model. 
Consistent with the full model, the impact of social services density is significant and 
negative for the experimental group in the first move model and is significant and positive for 
the Section 8 group in the second move model. Comparing the models estimated for black 
and Hispanic households, I find that poverty rate is negatively associated with the likelihood 
of moving for both households. On the other hand, distance to central city is positively 
associated with the likelihood of moving for black households and negatively associated with 







Table 24. Logit Results of the First Move and Second Move Models by MTO Treatment Group 
Variable First Move, Coefficient Second Move, Coefficient 
   Experimental Section 8 Control Experimental Section 8 Control 
Metro Controls         
  Baltimore 0.972 -1.454 -0.637 0.800 2.666** 0.546 
  Boston -0.659 -2.229* -1.736*** -2.427** -2.881* -0.242 
  LA -0.850* -2.660** -1.590*** -1.408 0.164 -1.816*** 
  NYC -1.872*** -3.602*** -2.931*** -1.018 -3.324** -3.011*** 
   
        
Household Characteristics         
  Vehicle Access 0.232 0.072 0.056 0.077 0.639 1.246 
  Income -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000** -0.000 
  Age of HH head -0.050*** -0.059*** -0.045*** -0.041* -0.019 -0.026 
  HH head Black 0.463 0.706* 0.003 0.198 -1.197 1.178 
  HH head Hispanic 0.551 0.509 -0.332 -0.232 -0.977 2.577** 
  HH head female 0.309 0.271 -0.026 0.152 0.194 1.230 
  HH head married 0.128 0.286 0.454 2.192** -1.637 -0.044 
  # children in HH -0.007 0.007 0.079 -0.169 0.490* 0.069 
  HH head has high school degree 0.002 0.023 0.021 0.561 0.496 0.337 
  HH head employed -0.011 0.259 -0.231 -0.900 0.108 -0.119 
   
        
Neighborhood Characteristics         
  Poverty rate 0.156 -0.161 -2.341** -4.098* -4.319 1.928 
  % White 0.940 0.447 0.509 2.044* -1.519 0.463 
  Distance to central city (mile) -0.029 0.102 -0.026 0.016 -0.082** 0.028 
  % Rental units with the rent below the FMR -1.859 -1.103 0.334 -2.093 -0.438 1.844 





   
        
Social Networks         
  Friend(s) living in a baseline neighborhood -0.052 0.202 -0.244 0.528 -0.529 0.395 
  Family member(s) living in a baseline neighborhood 0.315 -0.408* 0.122 0.109 0.009 0.111 
  Social resources in a baseline neighborhood 0.028 0.500 -0.126 0.067 0.098 -0.552 
  Duration of residency in a second neighborhood - - - -2.646*** -2.113*** -2.752*** 
   
        
constant 5.875*** 6.669*** 6.208*** 12.383*** 13.392*** 4.573* 
           
Number of observations 1,617 1,169 1,228 771 532 522 
Wald chi-square 153.32*** 107.30*** 124.16*** 117.93*** 84.10*** 121.38*** 
Pseudo R2 0.169 0.181 0.156 0.874 0.862 0.798 
 
Table 25. Logit Results of the First Move and Second Move Models by Race and Ethnicity 
Variable First Move, Coefficient Second Move, Coefficient 
   Black Hispanic Black Hispanic 
Treatment Effects       
  Experimental group 0.692*** 0.920*** 1.094*** 0.287 
  Section 8 group 0.973*** 1.027*** 1.324*** 0.108 
   
      
Metro Controls       
  Baltimore 0.107 (dropped) 0.352 3.856 
  Boston -1.169** -12.205*** -1.633*** -8.410*** 
  LA -1.911*** -12.009*** -1.553*** -7.105*** 
  NYC -2.863*** -13.041*** -2.013*** -9.342*** 
   
      





  Vehicle Access -0.062 0.350 0.892 0.240 
  Income -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
  Age of HH head -0.063*** -0.047*** -0.030 -0.057** 
  HH head female -0.202 0.360 0.815 0.793 
  HH head married 0.818** 0.054 -0.143 0.925 
  # children in HH 0.041 0.094** 0.154 -0.049 
  HH head has high school degree -0.026 0.148 0.168 1.782*** 
  HH head employed 0.064 -0.151 -0.869** 0.217 
   
      
Neighborhood Characteristics       
  Poverty rate -1.783* -0.352 -1.610 -4.694 
  % White 0.678 0.473 0.954 -2.073** 
  Distance to central city (mile) 0.151** -0.053 0.057 -0.078** 
  % Rental units with the rent below the FMR 0.766 -3.060* 0.280 0.292 
  Social services jobs per 100 persons 0.001 -0.005*** 0.008* 0.001 
   
      
Social Networks       
  Friend(s) living in a baseline neighborhood 0.013 -0.096 -0.074 0.168 
  
Family member(s) living in a baseline 
neighborhood 
-0.011 0.149 -0.430 1.351* 
  Social resources in a baseline neighborhood -0.139 0.203 0.242 -0.512 
  Duration of residency in a second neighborhood - - -2.211*** -2.935*** 
   
      
constant 5.353*** 17.691*** 7.008*** 19.325*** 
         
Number of observations 2,517 1,274 1,235 519 
Wald chi-square 243.36*** 654.38*** 168.23*** 329.36*** 





4.3.3. Multinomial Logistic Regression Results 
Table 26 reports multinomial logit results of the first move and second move models. In the 
first move model, MTO treatment group effects were large and significant. As expected, 
those in the experimental and Section 8 groups are less likely to move within a baseline 
neighborhood or to enter one of the adjacent neighborhoods that surround the baseline 
neighborhood, compared to moving to another neighborhood. On the other hand, being a 
member of a MTO treatment group is not statistically associated with residential mobility in 
the second model. Both of the models present the influence of the Boston control consistently 
across the dependent variables, which indicates that those living in Boston are more likely to 
move closer proximity to a baseline neighborhood compared with those living in Chicago. 
Among all household characteristics, measures of age of household head and vehicle access 
contribute the most to residential mobility towards the baseline neighborhood, although the 
effect of vehicle access is only significant in the first move within the baseline neighborhood. 
Those with a high school degree are more likely to move back to the baseline neighborhood 
from a second neighborhood, rather than moving to another neighborhood. Regarding the 
measures of neighborhood characteristics, I find that poverty rates are positively associated 
with the likelihood of moving within or back to a baseline neighborhood. In the first move 
model, households are more likely to move within the baseline neighborhood that exhibit 
higher poverty rates, lower percentage-white population, and fewer affordable housing 
options for housing voucher recipients. On the other hand, in the second move model, those 
living closer proximity to central city are more likely to move back to the baseline 






Table 26. Multinomial Logit Results of the First Move and Second Move Models 
    
First Move, 



















Treatment Effects       
  Experimental group -0.868*** -0.801***  -0.390 -0.634 
  Section 8 group -0.958*** -0.631***  -0.298 -0.751* 
   
      
Metro Controls      
  Baltimore 0.246 0.352  1.205** 0.542 
  Boston 1.891*** 0.894***  2.232*** 1.523*** 
  LA 0.491* 0.700*  1.837*** 1.074** 
  NYC 0.515** -0.055  1.753*** 0.593 
   
      
Household Characteristics      
  Vehicle Access -0.780*** -0.105  -0.291 -0.205 
  Income 0.000*** 0.000  -0.000 -0.000 
  Age of HH head 0.012* 0.035***  0.058*** 0.029 
  HH head Black -0.118 0.274  0.006 -0.480 
  HH head Hispanic 0.247 0.422*  -0.426 -0.900 
  HH head female -0.106 0.001  0.248 -0.248 
  HH head married 0.142 -0.280  -0.090 0.619 
  # children in HH 0.000 0.014  0.005 -0.051 
  HH head has high school degree -0.062 -0.039  0.526** 0.245 
  HH head employed -0.155 0.059  -0.511 0.278 
   
      
Neighborhood Characteristics      
  Poverty rate 3.538*** -0.442  0.512 1.678 
  % White -0.889* -1.391***  0.357 -0.420 
  Distance to central city (mile) 0.033 -0.146**  -0.066** 0.029 
  
% Rental units with the rent below 
the FMR 
-1.502* -1.151  0.812 -1.164 
  Social services jobs per 100 persons -0.000 -0.000  0.002 0.002 
   
      
Social Networks      
  
Friend(s) living in a baseline 
neighborhood 
0.177 -0.031  0.426* 0.336 
  
Family member(s) living in a 
baseline neighborhood 
0.324** 0.375**  1.063*** 0.444 
  
Social resources in a baseline 
neighborhood 






Duration of residency in a second 
neighborhood - -  
-0.519*** 0.220 
         
constant -3.494*** -2.767**  -6.519*** -4.059*** 
         
Number of observations 3,532  1,087 
Wald chi-square 276.13***  140.86*** 
Pseudo R2 0.073   0.128 
 
Holding other variables constant, the presence of family members in the baseline 
neighborhood is highly associated with the likelihoods of moving within a baseline 
neighborhood, moving to an adjacent neighborhood to the baseline neighborhood, and 
moving from a second neighborhood to the baseline neighborhood, compared to the 
likelihood of moving to another neighborhood. This association is stronger than all other 
social networks covariates. The influence of the presence of friends is also significant in the 
second move model. Those with friends living in the baseline neighborhood are more likely 
to move back to the baseline neighborhood rather moving to another neighborhood. 
Consistent with logit results, a shorter duration of residency in a second neighborhood is 
associated with the likelihood of moving back to the baseline neighborhood. 
Table 27 and Table 28 present multinomial logit results from the separate models 
estimated for each MTO treatment group and for households by race and ethnicity. Note that 
the Hispanic models failed to achieve convergence, due to low variation in the metropolitan 
control variables in the Hispanic sample. Since these variables were not crucial to my 
analysis, a decision was made to drop these variable from the model so that the remaining 
coefficients could be estimated. Similar to the logit results, findings from these models 
suggest that the sign and impact of neighborhood characteristics and social networks vary by 
treatment group and between black and Hispanic families. In the first move model, those in 
the experimental group and control group who lived in higher poverty neighborhoods are 





neighborhood. In the second move model, those in the Section 8 group and control group who 
lived closer to a central city are more likely to move back to the baseline neighborhood 
compared to moving to another neighborhood. In contrast, black and Hispanic households 
show opposite signs in the impact of poverty rate. While black households in higher poverty 
neighborhoods and Hispanic households in lower poverty neighborhoods tend to move within 
the baseline neighborhood in their first moves, black households in lower poverty 
neighborhoods and Hispanic households in higher poverty neighborhoods tend to move back 
to the baseline neighborhood in their second moves. With regard to the impact of social 
networks, those in the experimental group show similar results to the full sample result in the 
second move model. The magnitude of the impact of the presence of family members in the 
baseline neighborhood is the highest among those in the experimental group, followed by the 
control group and Section 8 group. The impact of the presence of friends in the baseline 
neighborhood is significant and large for those in the experimental group. Similarly, both 
black and Hispanic households with strong social ties in the baseline neighborhood are more 
likely to move back to the initial neighborhood, while the impact of the presence of family 
members is higher for Hispanic households than black households and the impact of the 









Table 27. Multinomial Logit Results of the First Move and Second Move Models by MTO Treatment Group 
    First Move, Coefficient Second Move, Coefficient 
















































              
  Baltimore -0.482 0.576 0.201 0.044 1.108** -0.030 0.646 0.869 1.956 -0.471 0.888 1.238 
  Boston 1.544*** 0.986 1.798*** 0.743 2.632*** 0.983* 1.780** 0.808 2.049 2.587** 2.281** 2.365* 
  LA 0.378 -0.297 -0.435 0.650 1.470*** 1.788*** 1.562** 0.773 2.724** 0.531 2.373** 2.427** 
  NYC -0.068 -0.181 0.159 -0.053 1.675*** -0.064 1.155 0.171 2.532** -0.225 1.687 2.111 
   
              
Household Characteristics 
              
  Vehicle Access 
-0.613* 0.065 -0.661 0.019 
-
0.959*** 
-0.252 -0.140 -0.914 -1.108 0.077 -0.176 0.552 
  Income 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 
  Age of HH head 0.004 0.053*** 0.014 0.021 0.018 0.036*** 0.079*** 0.050 0.049** 0.054 0.062** -0.003 
  HH head Black -0.100 1.157*** -0.267 -0.050 -0.203 0.054 -0.107 -1.384 -1.221* 2.259 0.376 -0.844 
  HH head Hispanic 0.343 1.742*** 0.209 -0.348 0.102 0.207 -1.314 -1.255 -1.238* 1.010 0.478 -1.848** 
  HH head female 




  HH head married 0.480 -0.684 0.003 0.404 -0.085 -0.737 -0.023 -0.318 0.012 2.055** 0.463 1.939** 
  # children in HH -0.043 0.087 0.062 0.085 -0.021 -0.048 -0.011 -0.118 0.092 0.240 -0.099 -0.598** 
  HH head has high school degree -0.312 -0.075 0.420 -0.088 -0.143 0.098 0.141 0.188 1.110** 0.374 0.564 0.288 
  HH head employed -0.113 -0.189 -0.797** 0.234 0.160 0.239 -0.399 0.424 -0.614 -0.202 -0.536 0.460 
   
              
Neighborhood Characteristics 
              
  Poverty rate 4.391*** -0.233 2.194 -1.862 4.165*** -0.206 2.148 2.820 -0.142 -0.049 -1.054 2.381 





  Distance to central city (mile) 





% Rental units with the rent below 
the FMR 
-2.913** -2.550* -1.181 2.749* -1.355 -1.900 1.450 -0.455 1.535 1.515 -1.472 -5.332** 
  Social services jobs per 100 persons 0.004* -0.014 0.003 0.001 -0.005* 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.004 -0.208 0.002 0.003 
   
              
Social Networks 
              
  
Friend(s) living in a baseline 
neighborhood 
0.026 0.077 0.391 0.107 0.148 -0.285 1.140** 0.034 0.345 0.795 0.068 0.510 
  
Family member(s) living in a 
baseline neighborhood 
0.213 0.733*** 0.364 0.046 0.364* 0.324 1.518*** 0.482 0.348 0.058 1.170** 0.453 
  
Social resources in a baseline 
neighborhood 
0.544 0.416 -0.400 1.229 -0.184 0.294 0.998 -0.411 1.308 0.458 0.990 0.239 
  
Duration of residency in a second 
neighborhood - - - - - - 
-0.754** 0.215 -0.981** 0.494 -0.011 0.171 
          
       
constant 













                 
Number of observations 1,459 1,051 1,022 494 337 256 
Wald chi-square 141.68*** 111.13*** 100.14*** 118.85*** 339.45*** 81.63*** 
Pseudo R2 0.091 0.082 0.078 0.187 0.237 0.208 
 
Table 28. Multinomial Logit Results of the First Move and Second Move Models by Race and Ethnicity 
    First Move, Coefficient Second Move, Coefficient 






























Treatment Effects           





  Section 8 group -0.999*** -0.788*** -0.972*** -0.557* -0.374 -0.779* -0.257 -0.389 
   
          
Metro Controls 
          
  Baltimore -0.056 0.575 - - 1.490*** 0.551 - - 
  Boston 1.744*** 1.009** - - 2.152*** 1.686** - - 
  LA 0.886 0.665 - - 2.137*** 1.334** - - 
  NYC 0.479 0.064 - - 1.304** 0.815 - - 
   
          
Household Characteristics 
          
  Vehicle Access -0.815*** -0.518* -0.810*** 0.470 -0.274 -0.846 -0.139 1.808** 
  Income 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  Age of HH head 0.003 0.041*** 0.011 0.022 0.045*** 0.030 0.109*** 0.096** 
  HH head female -0.196 0.150 -0.149 0.024 -0.544 -1.508** 0.775 -0.376 
  HH head married -0.161 -0.563 0.216 -0.043 -0.041 0.482 0.814 0.205 
  # children in HH 0.053 0.066 -0.028 -0.062 0.049 -0.151 0.033 0.266 
  HH head has high school degree -0.025 0.012 -0.103 -0.312 0.702** -0.066 1.003 0.965 
  HH head employed -0.069 0.147 0.014 0.070 -0.324 1.074** -1.601** -1.766* 
   
          
Neighborhood Characteristics 
          
  Poverty rate 3.086*** 0.277 -0.085 -2.464* -0.490 0.911 1.275 -2.417 
  % White -1.499* -2.191*** 0.642 -0.844 0.909 -1.616 -2.817 3.493*** 
  Distance to central city (mile) -0.036 -0.090 0.024 -0.139** -0.053* 0.018 -0.218** -0.005 
  
% Rental units with the rent below the 
FMR 
-2.181* -2.329** 1.084 -1.261 2.051* -0.533 -2.429 0.368 
  Social services jobs per 100 persons -0.001 -0.000 0.004* -0.001 0.002 -0.002 -0.005 0.005 
   
          
Social Networks 
          
  
Friend(s) living in a baseline 
neighborhood 






Family member(s) living in a baseline 
neighborhood 
0.265 0.352* 0.361 0.374 1.025*** 0.534 1.700*** 0.669 
  
Social resources in a baseline 
neighborhood 
0.314 0.390 -0.324 1.401* 0.769 0.720 0.792 -3.121 
  
Duration of residency in a second 
neighborhood - - - - 
-0.658*** 0.335 -0.267 0.328 
             
constant -2.448* -2.313** -2.848** -1.062 -6.722*** -3.755** -3.899 -6.440 
             
Number of observations 2,287 1,059 792 264 
Wald chi-square 177.97*** 73.18*** 122.53*** 108.52*** 






I conducted simulations to identify the joint impact of kinship/friendship and social 
resources on neighborhood mobility. Table 29 displays the predicted probabilities of moving 
back to a baseline neighborhood for different levels of social networks using coefficients 
from the full sample second move model and those estimated for the experimental group and 
black households. The predictions are based on similarly significant coefficients in all of 
these models. Values of the presence of friends and family members and the social resources 
score were allowed to vary, while the other variables were held at their respective means. Due 
to the insignificance of the social resources score coefficient, the predictions for this group 
are less precise. When second-time movers make a decision on where to move, the average 
household with both friends and family members living in the baseline neighborhood is more 
likely to move back to the baseline neighborhood, followed by the average household with 
family members only, with friends only, and with neither friends nor family members in the 
baseline neighborhood. In the full model, those with both friends and family members are 
approximately four times more likely to move back to the baseline neighborhood than those 
with neither friends nor family members across all values of social resources scores. In the 
experimental group sample, on the other hand, those with both friends and family members 
are about 13 times more likely to move back to the baseline neighborhood than those with 
neither friends nor family members. Black households also show a five times greater 
probability of moving back to the original neighborhood with both friends and family 
members than those without friends or family members do. Nonetheless, the disparity in the 
probabilities of moving back to the baseline neighborhood increases with a high social 
resources score (fully dependency on social networks for social services) compared to a low 
score (zero dependency) in all samples and in all types of social ties, while black households 






Table 29. Predicted Probabilities of Moving Back to a Baseline Neighborhood by 
Kinship/Friendship and Social Resources 




score     
  
No friends or 
family Friends only Family only 
Friends and 
family 
Full Low 1.7% 2.5% 4.6% 6.8% 
  High 3.5% 5.2% 9.3% 13.3% 
        
Experimental 
Group Low 0.4% 1.2% 1.8% 5.3% 
  High 1.1% 3.3% 4.7% 13.4% 
        
Black Low 1.1% 2.4% 3.1% 6.3% 




Across all measures of neighborhood mobility patterns, randomization into the MTO control 
group had a strong association with staying in or re-entering a baseline neighborhood, while 
the experimental group showed the lowest association. Nearly 70 percent of the total MTO 
households left a baseline neighborhood and never came back to their initial neighborhood or 
its adjacent neighborhoods. Given that most participants initially lived in public housing 
projects in central cities (Orr et al. 2003), the MTO experiment contributed to the 
suburbanization of the poor, both under geographic constraints and without such constraints. 
The percentage difference in the likelihood of leaving the baseline neighborhood and never 
coming back between the experimental group and the control group is 14 percent. This is not 
an unusual finding as both experimental group and section 8 group receive housing vouchers. 
While receiving housing search assistance, the experimental group face geographic 





poverty neighborhood with poverty rates less than 10 percent. Since most baseline 
neighborhoods tend to have poverty rates of higher than 10 percent, it makes these 
neighborhoods undesirable for those in experimental group to use their vouchers. 
Experimental households are also required to live in low-poverty neighborhoods for at least a 
year after initial random assignment, which is why the median experimental household that 
entered an adjacent neighborhood to the baseline neighborhood spent almost one and a half 
years in another neighborhood between the baseline neighborhood and its adjacent one. 
Taking these households into account the probability of moving back or in closer proximity 
to one’s initial neighborhood, more than 25 percent of the total number of experimental 
households preferred to live in the baseline neighborhood or at least adjacent ones, despite the 
benefits of voucher use and housing search counseling assistance.  
I find that social services density has a significant, negative effect on the likelihood 
of the move from the first neighborhood, while all other neighborhood characteristics have 
insignificant effects. Given that those who moved have higher average values in the presence 
of family members and friends, and a higher social resources score, it may imply that movers 
attempted either to be closer to their social networks or to distance themselves from their 
social networks. On the one hand, households in neighborhoods with lower access to social 
services might move to neighborhoods where relatives or friends lived to depend on social 
networks for costly services. On the other hand, households who had initially fewer options 
to get social services and inevitably relied on local social networks might move to 
neighborhoods in which they exhibit greater access to social services. This finding is 
consistent with the qualitative finding by Briggs et al. (2010) in that most households moved 
closer to their social networks to maintain a central role in daily life, while some households 






I also find that households tend to move back to their initial neighborhoods when 
they have strong kinship and friendship in these neighborhoods, although they have left to 
seek better neighborhood-level social services. MTO participants in neighborhoods with less 
social services jobs were more likely to move out of the first neighborhood, but these movers 
were more likely to move back to the original neighborhood if they had either family 
members or friends there. Moving back to the initial neighborhood implies that households 
failed to find available social services such as childcare in a new neighborhood and returned 
in order to be closer to their social networks to get practical help. According to the 
neighborhood opportunity literature, social networks provide households with the 
metropolitan opportunity set by filtering and assessing resources and information around 
neighborhoods (Galster and Killen 1995). Even if MTO households moved to neighborhoods 
with better quality social services, they still might have no access to such opportunities 
because of an absence of social networks that would introduce such opportunities to the new 
comers. In other words, relocation to high-opportunity neighborhoods would not substantially 
increase the perceived opportunity set for the poor unless local social networks connects them 
with available information and resources. This might be the reason why the impacts of social 
services density were non-significant in my logit models. 
In the separate models estimated for each MTO treatment group, the impact of 
neighborhood poverty rate is different in the first move and second move models, which 
captures geographic restrictions in voucher use in the MTO program. Since those in the 
control group did not have a voucher and were not required to live in a low-poverty 
neighborhood, neighborhoods with a lower poverty rate provided low-income households 
with less access to social networks and thus pushed them to make a move from their initial 
neighborhoods. However, since those in the experimental group were required to use their 





from the second neighborhood once they lived in low-poverty neighborhoods at least for one 
year which is the minimum length of time that they are required to stay. Also, I find that the 
impacts of social network variables in the second move multinomial logit model were 
greatest for those in the experimental group compared to those in the Section 8 group. This 
finding can be also explained in the context of the MTO geographic constraint, which 
suggests that forced voucher use in low-poverty neighborhoods led households to move back 
to their initial neighborhoods rather than staying in these neighborhoods or moving to another 
neighborhood.  
Controlling for other determinants of residential mobility, the effects of metropolitan 
variables likely capture metropolitan differences in rental housing markets and other 
neighborhood characteristics. I find evidence of considerable heterogeneity in the likelihood 
of moving by metropolitan area. Those in New York reported the lowest probability moving 
out of the first neighborhood relative to the omitted metropolitan area (Chicago), followed by 
Los Angeles. As I find in Chapter 3, these metropolitan areas have suffered severe affordable 
housing gaps, which might limit voucher households to find a rental unit in a desirable 
neighborhood as they compete with non-subsidized low-income renters. Consistent rising 
rents over time might have also constrained MTO participants, particularly those in the 
experimental group, to move because the applicable FMR might have offer a limited set of 







Chapter 5: Vehicle Access and Locational Attainment 
 
This chapter examines the effect of vehicle access on locational attainment. Moving to 
Opportunity (MTO) has been studied exhaustively to learn the impacts of living in low-
poverty neighborhoods, but its questions on access to automobiles have never been 
investigated in depth. I explore the dynamics of neighborhood conditions for MTO 
participants by levels and changes in levels of vehicle access since the baseline survey, and 
estimate locational attainment models that address a wide range of variables capturing 
various dimensions of neighborhood opportunity, focusing on the influence of vehicle access 
on neighborhood outcomes. 
 
5.1. Background 
5.1.1. Transportation and Location Choices 
Classic models of urban location and development posit that utility-maximizing households 
make tradeoffs between housing costs and intra-regional accessibility (Alonso 1964; Muth 
1969). For example, upper-income households in the United States often value housing 
consumption over accessibility, so that higher income households choose distant locations to 
consume a larger housing bundle, while lower income households select smaller housing in 
more accessible central-city locations. Public transportation further induces centralization of 
low-income populations, since the costs of owning and operating an automobile are high, and 
public transportation has been available mainly in centrally locations (LeRoy and Sonstelie 
1983; Glaeser et al. 2008). Considerable research confirms the importance of transportation 
accessibility for housing search and residential location (Abraham and Hunt 1997; Levine 





also matter for people’s neighborhood satisfaction, including walkability and land use mix 
(Yang 2008), proximity to public transportation (Baum et al. 2009), access to walking and 
biking paths (Kearney 2006; Chapman and Lombard 2006), and general accessibility to jobs 
and social services (St. John and Clark 1984).  
Transportation does not exert the only influence on residential choices and 
satisfaction, of course. Some studies suggest that at least until the early 1990s, affluent 
households moved to the suburbs primarily to escape perceived urban social problems 
including crime, poverty, and poor school quality (Mieszkowski and Mills 1993; Hamilton 
1982). These choices were reinforced, especially for homeowners, by high property-tax 
burdens in central cities (Grubb 1970). Transportation may also be less important today than 
it was in the 1950s and 1960s in terms of residential choice for a variety of reasons. Guiliano 
and Small (1993) offer several hypotheses concerning the limited influence of work commute 
on residential location choices. Commuting may not be as onerous as previously anticipated, 
particularly for short or infrequent trips. High job turnover combined with high moving costs 
may induce households to choose a residential location that is accessible to a wide array of 
potential job locations, with the initial job location playing a less-important role. Two-worker 
households may be unable to find a location that minimizes the commute distance for both 
workers in the household. The desire to minimize the cost of non-work travel may be a more 
important determinant of location decisions. And other housing and neighborhood amenities 
may be more important than commute lengths in influencing location decisions. By 
implication, the importance of transportation to location and satisfaction likely varies by 
household type.  
Low-income households are considerably more constrained than upper-income 
households when deciding where to live. They must compete for a smaller supply of units at 





affordable rental housing acts as a further constraint. Low-income households also are 
disproportionately constituted of people who face non-income constraints in residential 
choices. They are more likely to be African American or Hispanic than to be white non-
Hispanic, which exposes them to discrimination in housing markets (Turner et al. 2013). 
Low-income households also disproportionately include single parents with children under 
18, whose responsibilities for childcare, other household responsibilities, and employment are 
difficult to balance even in the scarce neighborhoods where they can find an affordable home. 
Few locations where single low-income parents can live affordably, safely, and responsibly 
also have excellent amenities or public services. 
 
5.1.2. Neighborhood Outcomes of Housing Voucher Recipients 
While housing voucher recipients live in a wider variety of neighborhoods, they still cluster 
in some of their metropolitan area’s most racially segregated and impoverished 
neighborhoods (See Chapter 2.3). While these neighborhoods are less segregated than those 
of public housing projects, at least one study—a case study of Chicago—suggests that public-
housing residents live in neighborhoods whose walkability and accessibility exceed those of 
voucher users (Talen and Koschinsky 2011).  
Part of the challenge for researchers has been to isolate the influence of the voucher 
itself on locational outcomes. Since households must apply for vouchers, these households 
may exhibit unique characteristics that differentiate them from the larger population of 
potentially-eligible households. As a result, simple comparisons between the residential 
location outcomes of voucher recipients and other households may suffer from a selection 
bias problem. Data from the MTO program has allowed researchers to circumvent this hurdle 





Little systematic research has been conducted on how transportation affects voucher 
users’ location choices, and particularly how having access to one’s own car allows families 
to choose higher-opportunity neighborhoods. But a few studies suggest that voucher users—
like everyone else—can move to better neighborhoods when they own or have access to a 
car. One quantitative study found that access to a car increased the likelihood that MTO 
program participants successfully secured a lease using their voucher (Shroder 2002). Varady 
and Walker (2007) find that a major factor determining the location of moves was proximity 
to friends and relatives and the availability of public transportation. Clampet-Lundquist 
(2004) studied households relocated from the DuBois HOPE VI project in Philadelphia and 
finds that many were constrained in their housing search due to their lack of access to an 
automobile and perception that suburban public transportation opportunities were limited 
(reviewed in Varady 2010).  
Drawing on extensive interviews with MTO participants, Briggs et al. (2010) note: 
“The finding that different voucher holders are willing to make different trade-offs … 
underscores the importance of transportation as a determinant of accessibility. ‘Car vouchers’ 
and other tools could mitigate the trade-off between living in a safer neighborhood and 
having the desired level of access to one’s social supports and cherished institutions, such as 
‘church homes,’ as well as jobs or education and training programs” (Briggs et al. 2010, pp. 
232-233). In a similar vein, Rosenblatt and DeLuca (2012, p. 264) capture the difficulty of 
finding a high-opportunity neighborhood without a car in an interview with a Baltimore MTO 
participant who could not lease up in a low-poverty neighborhood: 
 
The buses only run a certain time and then they cuts off. So I don’t believe nobody 
dictating to me that I gotta move here, no transportation even though I have driver 





if I need to get to the store I gotta walk down the road....Like right now my job hours 
are 1–9 so if I’m out way in the county, and the bus stop running at 5 o’clock that’s 
not good to me right now. 
 
My review of the literature suggests that while the linkages between transportation 
access and residential location decisions have been explored in-depth, there is a paucity of 
studies examining the impact of transportation access on the neighborhood choices of low 
income households receiving rental housing assistance. Part of the challenge is likely due to 
the limited number of datasets offering information on car access, housing assistance, and 
residential location outcomes. In the next section, I discuss a unique dataset from the Moving 
to Opportunity program which provides robust longitudinal information on each of these 
outcomes. I rely on these data to address the question, “How does vehicle access influence 
the types of neighborhoods in which low-income households are able to secure housing 
following a move to a new neighborhood, controlling for other determinants of location 
choice?” 
 
5.2. Locational Attainment Models 
I rely on data from the MTO program to address two methodological issues. First, the 
simultaneity between residential and transportation choices complicates efforts to model each 
decision separately. Recently, a large literature has emerged to address the related question of 
whether transportation services and other built environment features influence a household’s 
subsequent travel behavior (see Boarnet and Crane [2001] for a review). Since households 
may choose whether to own a car, in part, in response to the range of transportation options 
available to them in their chosen residential location, a simple cross-sectional model of 





used to distinguish the direction of causality between auto access and locational outcomes. 
Another methodological challenge is that voucher applicants may exhibit unique 
unobservable characteristics that distinguish them from the pool of similar households who 
do not choose to apply for rental housing assistance. As a result, simple controls for voucher 
recipient status in models of locational outcomes may be insufficient to estimate the 
magnitude of the voucher treatment effect. 
To address potential reverse-causality between auto-access and locational outcomes, 
I adopt a procedure employed by studies examining the impact of auto access on employment 
outcomes (Gurley and Bruce 2005; Cervero et al. 2002). As in these studies, I restrict the 
sample to those who moved to a new neighborhood after random assignment and include 
controls for the household’s lagged level of auto access. Lagged auto access was measured at 
the time of the interim survey. I also examined models that included measures of lagged auto 
access at the time of the initial baseline survey but opted for measuring lagged auto access as 
of the interim period due to the long time lag between the baseline and final surveys (10 to 15 
years in most cases). Since it is still possible that a household’s level of auto-accessibility 
changes during the interim and final survey, I also include controls for whether the household 
gained or lost access to an automobile during the interim and final survey waves. One 
limitation of this approach is that changes in auto access may have occurred before or after 
the move to the neighborhood where the household lived at the time of the final survey. As a 
result, the “change in auto access” measures are potentially biased due to the reverse causality 
issue mentioned above. I decided to include these measures, however, due to the large change 
in auto access observed for MTO households between the baseline, interim, and final 
samples.  
To investigate residential location outcomes, I estimate several “locational 





characteristic associated with a household’s chosen neighborhood, and independent variables 
include household-level determinants of location choice. A few examples of studies 
employing versions of this type of empirical approach include Alba and Logan (1992), Bayer 
et al. (2004), Borjas (1998), Dawkins (2005), Freeman (2008), Ihlanfeldt and Scafidi (2002), 
Sampson (2008), and Woldoff (2008). Bayer et al. (2004) provide a unique interpretation of 
the household-level coefficients from such models that is analogous to the exposure index 
utilized by segregation researchers. According to Bayer et al. (2004), when the dependent 
variable is a measure of census-tract-level racial composition, the coefficient on a given 
household-level covariate can be interpreted as the average exposure of a given household 
type to the racial group residing in the surrounding census tract, conditioning on household-
level characteristics.  
The dependent variables in my locational attainment models include a wide range of 
variables capturing various dimensions of neighborhood opportunity. I include measures of 
various dimensions of sustainability and opportunity, including the neighborhood functional 
environment, social environment, natural environment, economic vitality, and access to 
opportunity. Functional environment indicators, which capture the quality of available 
housing, transportation, and other physical neighborhood infrastructure, include median gross 
rent, vacancy rates, percent of housing that is owner-occupied, percent of single-family units, 
and a transit access index, provided by the HUD Fair Housing Equity Assessment (FHEA) 
database (See HUD [2012] for a more detailed discussion of how the transit index is 
calculated). The neighborhood social environment refers to both the demographic makeup of 
residents and the strength and quality of the social networks present in a neighborhood. 
Indicators of this dimension include poverty rates, median household income, labor force 





percent of households headed by females, and the percent of the adult population with a high 
school degree or GED.  
The natural environment dimension captures the exposure to environmental hazards 
and presence of natural and built environment characteristics that may impact both residents’ 
health and a neighborhood’s desirability. Natural environment indicators include the percent 
of land that is in open space, population density, and cancer risk per million persons. To 
proxy for automobile emissions, I use GIS software to measure the percent of the census tract 
covered by 200 meter buffers surrounding major highways. One mile buffers are also 
established around major Toxic Release Inventory sites to determine the percent of the tract 
exposed to toxic hazards. A final natural environment indicator is “average block length,” 
which captures the average length of streets within a census tract. Tracts with longer average 
block lengths are assumed to exhibit more suburban and less walkable street patterns.  
The final two neighborhood dimensions examined are the neighborhood’s level of 
economic vitality and access to opportunity. Indicators of economic vitality include job 
density and aggregate income density. Access to opportunity is quantified using the HUD 
Fair Housing Equity Assessment (FHEA) school performance index, calculated as the percent 
of students proficient in reading and math on state test scores, weighted by total school 
enrollment (HUD 2012).  
These variables are taken from several sources, including the 2009 American 
Community Survey, the 2011 U.S. Geological Survey National Land Cover database, the 
2011 National-Scale Air Toxics Assessment, the 2009 Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) Toxic Release Inventory, the 2010 Census Longitudinal Employer-Household 
Dynamics, and the HUD FHEA database. In each regression model I include the lagged 
measure (as of the baseline surveys) of the same neighborhood characteristic used to 





dependent variables, including the 2000 U.S. Census, the 2001 U.S. Geological Survey 
National Land Cover database, the 2002 National-Scale Air Toxics Assessment, and the 2000 
EPA Toxic Release Inventory, with the exception of the job density, transit access, and 
school performance variables due to data unavailability around the year 2000. Table 30 
describes the source for each variable and the calculation method.  
 






Variable Description Calculation Method Source, Year 
Functional Environment   
 Median Gross Rent Median gross rent of specified renter-occ. units with rent ($) Census 2000 SF3, ACS 2009 5YR 
 Vacancy Rate Percent of housing units vacant Census 2000 SF3, ACS 2009 5YR 
 % Owner Occupied Percent of housing units owner-occupied Census 2000 SF3, ACS 2009 5YR 
 % Single-Family Units Percent of single-family (detached and attached) units Census 2000 SF3, ACS 2009 5YR 




 Poverty Rate Percent of persons in poverty Census 2000 SF3, ACS 2009 5YR 
 Median Household Income Median household income last yr ($) Census 2000 SF3, ACS 2009 5YR 
 Labor Force Participation Rate Labor force participation rate Census 2000 SF3, ACS 2009 5YR 
 Unemployment Rate  Unemployment rate Census 2000 SF3, ACS 2009 5YR 
 % Minority Population Percent minority population (not non-Hispanic white alone) Census 2000 SF3, ACS 2009 5YR 
 % Female Headed Households Percent of households that are female-headed households Census 2000 SF3, ACS 2009 5YR 
 % 25+ w High School Diploma / GED Percent of persons 25+ w/ at least a high school diploma or GED Census 2000 SF3, ACS 2009 5YR 
Natural Environment   
 % Open Space Percent of area covered by open space NLCD 2001 & 2011 
 Average Block Length Average block length  Census 2000 & 2010 TIGER/Line Data  
 Population Density Population per square mile Census 2000 SF3, ACS 2009 5YR 
 % Buffer of Major Highways Percent of tract covered by 200 m buffers surrounding major highways  Census 2000 & 2010 TIGER/Line Data  
 Cancer Risk / Million Cancer risk per 1 million population NATA 2002 & 2011 
 % Buffer of TRI Facilities Percent of tract covered by 1 mi buffers surrounding TRI facilities EPA TRI 2000 & 2009 
Economic Vitality   
 Job Density Total number of jobs per square mile Census LEHD 2010 
 Aggregate Income Density Aggregate income per square mile Census 2000 SF3, ACS 2009 5YR 
Access to Opportunity   





The independent variables in each model include a variety of household-level factors 
discussed in the literature that have been shown to be associated with neighborhood choice. 
To capture various policy impacts, I include measures of the randomly-assigned “treatment” 
group for each sample, interacted with whether the household has leased-up in their current 
location using a voucher at the time of the final survey. Including such information makes my 
estimates comparable to the “intent-to-treat (ITT)” and “treatment-on-treated (TOT)” effects 
commonly discussed in the MTO literature, as coefficients of dummy variables indicating 
Experimental and Section 8 groups are equal to the ITT effects and coefficients of interaction 
terms of treatment groups and lease-up are equal to the TOT effects (see Sanbonmatsu et al. 
[2011] for a more detailed discussion of these effects). I also include indicators of the 
household’s metro location, with Chicago omitted as the reference category.  
Other household characteristics include income, income squared, and number of 
children in the household. Characteristics of the household head include age, age squared, 
race and ethnicity, marital status, gender, education, and employment status. I include three 
measures of auto access. The first is an indicator variable equal to one if anyone in the 
household owned a car, van, or truck that runs at the time of the interim survey. I also include 
two indicator variables that capture whether the household gained or lost access to autos since 
the interim survey. All of these variables, with the exception of the auto access variables, 
were measured contemporaneously with the date of the final survey. All models are restricted 








5.3.1. Changes in Neighborhood Characteristics 
I begin with an examination of the metro- and household-level characteristics for the MTO 
sample, displayed in Table 31. The sample is fairly evenly-distributed across metros, with the 
smallest percentage of households living in Baltimore. Households in the sample have very 
low incomes ($21,330 on average), yet 41 percent has access to a vehicle. Consistent with 
other MTO research, I also find that the sample is disproportionately weighted towards 
African American households headed by unmarried females.  
 
Table 31. Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in the Linear Regression Analyses, MTO 
Final Survey 
Descriptive Statistics, Independent Variables 
     
  Obs Mean Std Dev 
Variable Description    
     
Treatment Effects    
 Experimental group 2,718 0.47 0.50 
 Section 8 group 2,718 0.21 0.41 
 Lease-up 2,408 0.51 0.50 
 Lease-up x Exp. group 2,408 0.27 0.44 
 Lease-up x Sec 8. group 2,408 0.12 0.33 
Metro Controls     
 Baltimore 2,328 0.18 0.38 
 Boston 2,328 0.20 0.40 
 LA 2,328 0.22 0.41 
 NY 2,328 0.16 0.36 
Household Characteristics    
 Car access at interim 2,242 0.41 0.49 
 Car access gained 2,226 0.13 0.34 
 Car access lost 2,226 0.12 0.32 
 Income 2,718 21,329.66 22,651.91 





 HH head Black 2,668 0.69 0.46 
 HH head Hispanic 2,689 0.28 0.45 
 HH head female 2,716 0.98 0.13 
 HH head married 1,656 0.19 0.39 
 # children in HH 2,718 1.54 1.55 
 HH head has high school degree 2,706 0.44 0.50 
 HH head employed 2,714 0.52 0.50 
          
 
Table 32 gives an initial picture of the changes in neighborhood conditions for each 
program participant since the baseline survey, stratified by levels and changes in levels of 
vehicle access. The major finding displayed in this table is that residential mobility generally 
resulted in improved neighborhood conditions. By the final survey, MTO households lived in 
neighborhoods with poverty rates that were about 24 percent lower than the baseline 
neighborhood poverty rate. Similar trends are observed across a wide range of census tract 
characteristics, with MTO households moving to census tracts with a lower vacancy rate and 
unemployment rate as well as higher median rents, percentage of owner-occupied units, 
percentage of single-family units, median household income, labor force participation rates, 
exposure to college-educated adults, exposure to open space, aggregate income density, and 
improved school performance. However, there are tradeoffs; the households’ new residences 
were less accessible to jobs and had poorer transit access and were more exposed to 
automobile emissions and toxic hazards.  
 


























Functional Environment      
 Median Gross Rent 544.94 512.10 533.27 571.20 573.57 





 % Owner Occupied 26.24 22.28 26.96 31.24 31.10 
 % Single-Family Units 21.64 17.46 19.95 26.94 26.30 
 FHEA Transit Access Index -11.34 -5.98 -15.15 -12.77 -17.79 
Social Environment      
 Poverty Rate -24.11 -21.52 -24.30 -26.99 -26.34 
 Median Household Income 22,373.76 19,750.27 21,686.16 25,502.95 25,253.22 
 Labor Force Participation Rate 14.72 13.40 14.16 15.89 15.78 
 Unemployment Rate  -11.35 -11.07 -11.89 -11.88 -11.00 
 % Minority Population -6.86 -4.26 -6.25 -8.98 -8.90 
 % Female Headed Households -8.99 -5.31 -7.95 -11.36 -11.89 
 
% 25+ w High School Diploma / 
GED 23.08 20.98 23.38 25.25 23.99 
Natural Environment      
 % Open Space 3.18 2.63 2.82 4.97 3.97 
 Average Block Length 143.31 -10.14 32.06 208.80 291.33 
 Population Density -9,773.23 -7,874.20 -7,852.26 -17,277.70 
-
10,495.08 
 % Buffer of Major Highways -7.54 -7.08 -9.40 -7.62 -7.00 
 Cancer Risk / Million -13.14 -12.95 -11.75 -14.20 -12.76 
 % Buffer of TRI Facilities -21.92 -21.92 -20.93 -20.21 -23.11 
Economic Vitality      
 Job Density -3,014.44 -3,025.84 -3,431.92 -4,469.37 -3,103.53 











Access to Opportunity      
 FHEA School Performance Index 2.57 1.39 1.48 1.37 6.36 
 
Compared to those who never had access to an automobile, households who had cars 
throughout the analysis period or subsequently gained access to cars saw higher increases in 
median rents, percentage of owner occupied housing, percentage of single-family units, 
median household income, labor force participation rates, exposure to college-educated 
adults, and exposure to open space, while at the same time experiencing greater reductions in 
neighborhood vacancy rates, poverty rates, and percentage of female headed households. The 
table also points to tradeoffs made as a result of mobility, with those with car access generally 
experiencing a larger decline in population density and increased exposure to less walkable 
environments. Curiously, while those with consistent access to a car saw considerable 





period saw slightly smaller increases in school quality with those who never had access to an 
automobile. Furthermore, the table suggests that consistent access to a car has different 
impacts on job density and aggregate income density than do changes in car access. These 
latter findings point to the importance of controlling for changes in automobile access over 
time in the locational attainment regressions. 
 
5.3.2. Linear Regression Results 
I now turn to an examination of linear regression models which control for the influence of 
household-level characteristics on locational outcomes. Table 33 displays these results, using 
measures of the neighborhood functional environment as dependent variables. The models 
explain between 18 to 47 percent of the variation in the dependent variables, a low goodness-
of-fit, but comparable to other locational attainment models reported in the literature (Bayer 
et al. (2004) 9 to 21 percent; Borjas (1998) 19 to 32 percent; Dawkins (2005) 25 to 30 
percent; Freeman (2008) 10 to 32 percent). All models display significant metropolitan 







Table 33. Linear Regression Results of Locational Attainment, Functional Environment 
OLS Linear Regression Results, Functional Environment 
       
Variable                         Dependent Variable: 
Median Gross 







Treatment Effects           
  Experimental group 24.341 1.077 3.772** 2.135 -2.627 
  Section 8 group -7.593 0.370 2.290 4.105* -2.842 
  Lease-up 132.023*** -0.754 7.493*** 5.843** -2.252 
  Lease-up x Exp. group 18.293 -2.378 0.461 0.172 0.374 
  Lease-up x Sec 8. group 39.537 -0.436 -1.480 -5.796 3.840 
Metro Controls            
  Baltimore 50.605** 8.046*** 5.762*** 30.668*** 6.619*** 
  Boston 212.576*** -10.213*** -0.644 -11.576*** 8.331*** 
  LA 147.143*** -13.012*** -4.310** 17.195*** -4.020 
  NY 113.108*** -12.750*** -19.595*** -24.674*** -33.510*** 
Household Characteristics           
  Car access at interim 32.364 -3.581*** 5.348*** 5.853*** -8.028*** 
  Car access gained 57.718** -3.324** 5.426*** 6.699*** -8.524*** 
  Car access lost -11.407 1.301 -2.353 -1.338 4.586 
  Income 0.003*** -0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000 
  Income squared -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  Age of HH head -0.618 -0.109 -0.787 -1.490** -0.853 
  Age of HH head squared 0.008 0.001 0.007 0.014** 0.008 
  HH head Black -53.929 0.970 -6.273** -2.206 6.395 
  HH head Hispanic -36.020 -1.033 -7.722*** -5.160 9.501** 
  HH head female 8.002 -2.044 6.408 13.681** -2.859 
  HH head married -18.777 0.594 -0.242 2.259 -1.670 
  # children in HH -3.615 0.148 0.562 0.822 -2.021*** 





  HH head employed 1.567 -0.801 0.637 1.054 1.983 
             
Baseline Neighborhood Characteristic -0.210*** 0.058 0.007 -0.004 0.046 
Constant 754.306*** 29.717*** 49.410*** 54.819*** 94.294*** 
             
  Number of Observations 1,054 1,055 1,055 1,038 1,019 
             






Household characteristics exhibit varying impacts across models. As expected, 
income is positively associated with attaining a residential location in areas exhibiting higher 
median gross rents and a higher percentage of owner-occupied housing. The impacts of age, 
race, ethnicity, and gender of the household head are statistically significant in some models 
but not in others. Regarding the influence of access to autos, having auto access at the time of 
the interim survey and gaining a car during the survey period is associated with residing in 
neighborhoods with lower vacancy rates, a higher percentage of owner-occupied housing, a 
higher percentage of single-family units, and lower access to transit service.  
The influence of voucher use along with treatment group assignment differs by 
functional environment measure. Using a voucher at the time of the final survey is associated 
with residing in neighborhoods exhibiting higher median rents, a higher percentage of owner-
occupied housing, and a higher percentage of single-family units. Those assigned to the 
Experimental group reside in neighborhoods with a higher percentage of owner-occupied 
housing, whereas those assigned to the Section 8 group reside in neighborhoods with a higher 
percentage of single-family units. 
Table 34 displays the same set of regression results for the models relying on 
measures of the neighborhood social environment as dependent variables. Here I find that 
race, and to a lesser extent ethnicity, are significantly associated with a variety of 
neighborhood outcomes. Specifically, households headed by African Americans and 
Hispanics reside in neighborhoods with higher poverty rates, lower median household 
income, lower labor force participation rates, higher unemployment rates, higher minority 
percentages, higher female-headed household percentages, and a lower percentage of adult 
high school graduates. Among all household characteristics, initially having access to an auto 





environment outcomes, with initial access significantly influencing all outcomes except 







Table 34. Linear Regression Results of Locational Attainment, Social Environment 
OLS Linear Regression Results, Social Environment 
         





















Treatment Effects               
  Experimental group -2.356* 2,722.101* 1.224 -0.592 -1.920 -2.460 0.826 
  Section 8 group -1.226 1,631.130 0.626 -0.799 -0.069 -3.510 -0.955 
  Lease-up -6.157*** 4,464.098*** 3.273*** -1.915** -0.423 -4.161* 2.060 
  Lease-up x Exp. group -0.305 2,187.475 0.141 -0.329 -2.402 -2.206 2.047 
  Lease-up x Sec 8. group 0.806 1,248.180 0.596 -0.416 -2.872 2.836 1.963 
Metro Controls                
  Baltimore -8.159*** 6,197.569*** 1.572 -6.756*** -12.332*** -4.125* -3.676*** 
  Boston -10.182*** 14,311.759*** 7.621*** -7.951*** -25.800*** -13.572*** 1.896 
  LA -5.300*** 5,247.753*** 3.516*** -9.496*** -0.263 -28.499*** -20.635*** 
  NY -5.709*** 5,207.448*** 0.334 -8.838*** -6.303*** -9.596*** -5.626*** 
Household Characteristics               
  Car access at interim -4.539*** 4,214.392*** 2.042*** -0.804 -2.324 -3.452* 4.547*** 
  Car access gained -5.428*** 4,811.417** 2.227** -0.311 -0.392 -0.900 3.121** 
  Car access lost 1.443 -1,751.824 -0.515 0.398 3.135 2.428 -1.855 
  Income -0.000 0.086 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
  Income squared -0.000 0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
  Age of HH head 0.405 -77.990 0.136 0.112 -0.708 0.742 -0.224 
  Age of HH head squared -0.004 0.729 -0.001 -0.001 0.007 -0.006 0.003 
  HH head Black 5.150*** -7,392.263*** -1.869* 2.676*** 17.066*** 14.338*** -2.977* 
  HH head Hispanic 5.560*** -5,970.892** -2.363** 2.262** 13.175*** 10.239*** -5.128*** 
  HH head female 0.558 1,003.083 -1.427 -0.296 -3.125 -4.652 0.588 





  # children in HH 0.562* -616.161* -0.420* 0.167 0.463 0.897** -0.368 
  HH head has high school degree 0.445 -483.800 0.004 -0.362 -0.721 0.677 -0.113 
  HH head employed -0.840 -48.986 0.743 -0.335 0.324 0.111 0.923 
                 
Baseline Neighborhood Characteristic -0.035 -0.147** -0.053 -0.026 0.017 -0.051 -0.037 
Constant 26.228** 34,822.813*** 55.053*** 17.127** 98.868*** 42.108** 80.147*** 
                 
  Number of Observations 1,055 1,055 1,055 1,038 1,055 1,055 1,055 
                 







Regarding the influence of various MTO policy effects, households who leased-up 
reside in neighborhoods with lower poverty rates, higher median household income, higher 
labor force participation rate, lower unemployment rate, and fewer female-headed 
households, while those in the Experimental group reside in neighborhoods with lower 
poverty rates and higher median household income. Comparing the magnitudes of these 
effects, using a voucher has a much larger impact on these locational attainment outcomes 
than does assignment to the Experimental group.  
Table 35 displays the same set of regression results using natural environment 
features as dependent variables. In these models, the influence of household characteristics is 
more variable by outcome measure. The race and ethnicity of the household head are 
significant in one or more models, but no other household characteristic other than vehicle 
access exhibits consistently significant impacts. Those with access to vehicles move to 
neighborhoods with more open space that exhibit lower population densities and more 






Table 35. Linear Regression Results of Locational Attainment, Natural Environment 
OLS Linear Regression Results, Natural Environment 
        





% Buffer of 
Major 
Highways 
Cancer Risk / 
Million 
% Buffer of 
TRI Facilities 
Treatment Effects             
  Experimental group 0.233 41.203 2,006.355 -1.800 -0.823 -7.363* 
  Section 8 group 0.523 166.012 2,396.813 1.905 -3.680* 0.588 
  Lease-up 2.704*** 83.845 -3,412.201* -2.256 -2.035 -11.038** 
  Lease-up x Exp. group 0.049 66.051 -3,282.366 -0.115 2.201 6.076 
  Lease-up x Sec 8. group -1.510 -177.544 959.071 -4.073 5.839** 7.499 
Metro Controls              
  Baltimore 13.486*** 83.053 -4,709.805*** 23.621*** 13.449*** -5.962 
  Boston 0.051 151.834* 4,112.126*** 6.693*** 7.083*** 7.345* 
  LA -0.183 560.682*** 3,430.225** 0.359 25.164*** 1.753 
  NY -0.649 124.445 67,932.892*** 2.126 27.297*** -5.331 
Household Characteristics             
  Car access at interim 1.660** 117.940 -4,098.039*** 0.631 1.527 -3.796 
  Car access gained 2.002** 199.325** -3,607.083* -3.719* -0.728 3.382 
  Car access lost 0.113 -67.844 1,613.446 -2.882 -1.111 3.526 
  Income 0.000** 0.004 0.061 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
  Income squared -0.000** -0.000 -0.000** 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  Age of HH head -0.191 16.157 198.040 -0.211 -0.151 1.488 
  Age of HH head squared 0.002 -0.128 -3.371 0.002 0.003 -0.013 
  HH head Black -1.786 -227.881** -151.009 2.520 -1.712 -5.120 
  HH head Hispanic -1.021 -224.591** -1,174.314 5.359* -2.922 -2.382 
  HH head female -0.759 36.340 -2,038.655 -5.146 -3.171 -5.710 
  HH head married 0.468 13.993 1,673.138 1.996 0.266 2.868 





  HH head has high school degree -0.336 -88.873 839.777 0.629 1.078 1.927 
  HH head employed 0.561 89.154 -1,534.930 -1.070 0.225 2.835 
               
Baseline Neighborhood Characteristic -0.080 0.089** -0.187** -0.005 -0.016 0.102*** 
Constant 6.321 1,284.737** 21,429.379 25.655 44.316*** 1.739 
               
  Number of Observations 1,055 1,055 1,055 1,055 1,055 1,055 
               







Lease-up status is associated with a variety of natural environment outcomes, 
including higher levels of open space access, lower population density, and lower exposure to 
toxics. Assignment to the MTO treatment groups is also associated with lower cancer risk and 
lower exposure to toxics, but neither the experimental nor treatment group significantly 
influence other natural environment outcomes. 
Table 36 reports the results from regressions using measures of economic vitality and 
access to opportunity as dependent variables. I find that the effects of the two treatment 
groups and lease-up status are not significant. Some other household characteristics are 
significant, but significance levels vary substantially across the various outcome measures. 
Regarding the influence of auto access, initial access and gain in access is associated with 
living in areas with lower job density. The findings with respect to school performance are 
particularly interesting. I find that African Americans and Hispanics both exhibit poorer 
access to high-performing schools. Losing access to a car is associated with residence in a 






Table 36. Linear Regression Results of Locational Attainment, Economic Vitality and Access to Opportunity 
OLS Linear Regression Results, Economic Vitality and Access to Opportunity 
     
Variable                         Dependent Variable: Job Density Aggregate Income Density School Performance Index 
Treatment Effects       
  Experimental group 1,684.477 90,613,408.591 0.380 
  Section 8 group -695.971 49,284,154.491 0.400 
  Lease-up 1,095.242 -107,547,062.910 1.895 
  Lease-up x Exp. group -3,086.770 -104,558,814.099 0.463 
  Lease-up x Sec 8. group -1,362.992 344,244.373 -0.532 
Metro Controls        
  Baltimore -24.390 -74,587,595.656** 10.709*** 
  Boston 2,489.987 225,076,050.074*** 3.698* 
  LA 192.156 -17,497,946.055 6.413*** 
  NY 10,748.221*** 1,350,482,747.315*** 27.077*** 
Household Characteristics       
  Car access at interim -2,652.688* -64,903,061.439 1.751 
  Car access gained -2,989.818* -71,000,366.245 -0.314 
  Car access lost 879.575 -2,691,980.395 -5.372*** 
  Income 0.018 2,622.338 -0.000 
  Income squared -0.000 -0.043* 0.000 
  Age of HH head 381.224 19,315,944.793 -0.642 
  Age of HH head squared -3.847 -204,409.077 0.006 
  HH head Black -8,904.069* -75,034,017.512 -8.662*** 
  HH head Hispanic -4,907.116 -38,978,244.991 -7.229*** 
  HH head female 269.860 14,597,572.735 -2.607 
  HH head married -2,493.384 -85,774,390.238 2.270 
  # children in HH -84.513 -21,952,585.094 -0.182 





  HH head employed -678.763 -101,154,182.602* 0.370 
         
Baseline Neighborhood Characteristic 0.067 -0.298 0.191*** 
Constant 2,099.923 49,390,752.223 40.213** 
         
  Number of Observations 1,038 1,055 1,019 
         







Table 37 provides a summary of the regression coefficients for lease-up status, treatment 
group assignment, and automobile access across all regressions. These tables report all 
coefficients significant at the .10 level. Comparing models, I find that lease-up status has 
more significant impacts on locational attainment than being assigned to either the 
Experimental or Section 8 group. Part of the explanation for these findings may be 
attributable to the length of time between the initial random assignment and the final survey, 
which was 10 to 15 years later in many cases. Even with this length of time, however, initial 
assignment to the experimental group has effects on locational attainment which persist 
across several outcomes. Taken together, these findings suggest that the initial exposure to 
low-poverty neighborhoods has impacts on long-term locational attainment, particularly 






Table 37. Summary of Linear Regression Coefficients of Locational Attainment Models 











x Sec 8. 
Group 






          
Functional Environment         
 Median Gross Rent NS NS 132.023*** NS NS NS 57.718** NS 
 Vacancy Rate NS NS NS NS NS -3.581*** -3.324** NS 
 % Owner Occupied 3.772** NS 7.493*** NS NS 5.348*** 5.426*** NS 
 % Single-Family Units NS 4.105* 5.843** NS NS 5.853*** 6.699*** NS 
 FHEA Transit Access Index NS NS NS NS NS -8.028*** -8.524*** NS 
Social Environment         
 Poverty Rate -2.356* NS -6.157*** NS NS -4.539*** -5.428*** NS 
 Median Household Income 2,722.101* NS 4,464.098*** NS NS 4,214.392*** 4,811.417** NS 
 Labor Force Participation Rate NS NS 3.273*** NS NS 2.042*** 2.227** NS 
 Unemployment Rate  NS NS -1.915** NS NS NS NS NS 
 % Minority Population NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS 
 % Female Headed Households NS NS -4.161* NS NS -3.452* NS NS 
 
% 25+ w High School 
Diploma / GED 
NS NS NS NS NS 4.547*** 3.121** NS 
Natural Environment         
 % Open Space NS NS 2.704*** NS NS 1.660** 2.002** NS 
 Average Block Length NS NS NS NS NS NS 199.325** NS 
 Population Density NS NS -3,412.201* NS NS -4,098.039*** -3,607.083* NS 
 % Buffer of Major Highways NS NS NS NS NS NS -3.719* NS 
 Cancer Risk / Million NS -3.680* NS NS 5.839** NS NS NS 





Economic Vitality         
 Job Density NS NS NS NS NS -2,652.688* -2,989.818* NS 
 Aggregate Income Density NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS 
Access to Opportunity         
  
FHEA School Performance 
Index 







I find that auto access has significant impacts across a large number of locational 
outcomes, whether access is measured in terms of having a car at an earlier period or gaining 
access during the survey period. Those with access to cars gain access to neighborhoods with 
a more highly-valued housing stock, higher owner-occupied housing and single-family unit 
percentages, lower poverty rates, higher labor force participation rates, and a more educated 
adult population.  
I also find that when it comes to environmental conditions and outcomes associated 
with access to opportunity and economic vitality, there are tradeoffs associated with having 
access to a vehicle. While households with vehicles live in areas with more access to open 
space, having a vehicle also encourages moves to neighborhoods that are less conducive to 
walking and that are less accessible to jobs and transit. Thus, when it comes to measuring 
“opportunity,” one must recognize that the spatial distribution of opportunities is 
heterogeneous. When faced with an uneven distribution of opportunity structures, households 
must often make tradeoffs and choose those which are valued most highly. Although my 
approach does not allow me to distinguish between the impact of household preferences 
versus spatial supply constraints as they influence the residential outcomes observed, I find 
that auto access has fairly consistent impacts across a range of housing market, social, 
economic, and environmental outcomes, and that accessing one particular dimension of 
neighborhood opportunity often comes at the expense of other dimensions of opportunity. 
The findings on heterogeneity in reported levels of locational attainment in transit 
access by metropolitan area are somewhat unexpected, given that transportation infrastructure 
varies by metropolitan area. MTO participants in New York report the lowest levels of gains 
in transit access relative to the omitted metropolitan area (Chicago), followed by Los 
Angeles. New York has a more extensive heavy-rail public transit system, while Chicago has 





network outside of the core central city. Los Angeles has a more automobile-based 
transportation system that relies heavily on a bus-based public transportation service. 
Combining with the effects of metropolitan controls in other models, this finding implies that 
those in New York and Los Angeles sacrificed transit access the most to achieve locational 
attainments in other neighborhood attributes such as median gross rent and percentage of 
owner occupants. This finding accounts for trends in tight rental markets for low-income 









Chapter 6: Policy Implications and Conclusions 
 
6.1. Policy Implications 
6.1.1. Fair Market Rents and Affordable Housing 
My findings obtained from the analysis of segregation of affordable housing provide some 
important context for current policy initiatives. Although housing vouchers have expanded 
housing options in comparison to the set of housing choices affordable to extremely low-
income households in the market, most voucher households in the Moving to Opportunity 
metropolitan areas would have more housing options across the metropolitan area below the 
applicable Small Area Fair Market Rents than the applicable Fair Market Rent. Decomposed 
into different types of neighborhoods, the segregation of affordable housing would have 
improved in terms of spatial, economic, and racial aspects with Small Area FMRs. Despite 
high levels of inequality in low-poverty and high-percentage-white neighborhoods, the new 
rule would have provided voucher recipients with more evenly distributed affordable units 
across these neighborhoods, possibly leading to less segregation overall. 
In his panel study on urban poverty and housing instability, Desmond (2016) argued 
that the housing voucher program could be expanded without additional costs by 
implementing Small Area FMRs. He theorized that such a rule would cause landlords in low-
rent zip code areas to lower their rents to the applicable Small Area FMR because they would 
lose the incentive to overcharge due to the old payment standard. However, its feasibility also 
depends on the number of voucher recipients in low- and high-rent zip code areas. Assuming 
no moves, there should be an adequate number of overcharged vouchers in low-rent zip codes 
so that they can pay off the excess voucher costs in high-rent zip codes. Overcharging would 





overcharged vouchers in low-rent zip codes, the greater the budget to subsidize voucher 
households in high-rent zip codes. Nevertheless, if many voucher households move to high-
rent zip codes as the Small Area FMR intended, it would inevitably require more budget or 
cause fewer households to receive assistance. 
Besides its potential feasibility, Small Area FMRs might place a burden on housing 
voucher recipients who currently live in low-rent zip codes, since many of them would have 
to pay more under the new rule if they didn’t want to move. A reduction in subsidy followed 
by an increase in rent contribution would challenge them to secure housing stability in 
existing units. Even if they decide to stay, the housing cost burden remains a serious issue, 
leaving very little income for families to spend on other essentials, such as food, medical 
care, transportation expenses, education, and childcare. They might choose to move out, but 
additional constraints in residential location choices beyond financial barriers, such as 
discrimination by landlords, portability moves outside the jurisdiction of the housing 
authority, a lack of access to public transit or vehicle, and strong social ties in the poor, 
original neighborhoods, would often frustrate mobility decisions. Therefore, the 
implementation of Small Area FMRs must put cautious effort into addressing these imminent 
issues. 
Although HUD has recently announced a two-year suspension on the Small Area 
FMR rule, the final rule put cautious effort into addressing imminent issues (U.S. Department 
of Housing and Urban Development 2016). The final rule includes tenant protections, 
providing housing authorities with options to temporarily hold voucher contracts from 
payment standard reductions and gradually reduce housing assistance payment over time. The 
final rule would have been implemented to certain metropolitan areas meeting several criteria 






6.1.2. Social Networks 
My findings on the link between social networks and the pattern of neighborhood mobility 
have implications for housing search services. I find that more than 25 percent of the MTO 
experimental households preferred to live in their original neighborhoods or its adjacent 
neighborhoods while they were required to use a voucher in low-poverty neighborhoods only. 
Since most of the baseline neighborhood exhibits poverty rates higher than 10 percent, a 
quarter of these households were likely to give up the opportunity to use a voucher and ended 
up in neighborhoods which were familiar to them. If such a pattern is affected by the 
tendency to maintain existing social networks, housing vouchers would be used more 
effectively if they are combined with more information on available housing options near 
their current residence or in the same neighborhood in which other individual housing needs 
are met respectively.  
 The impact of neighborhood social services is somewhat mixed, but it plays a 
significant role in making the first move. Allard (2009) found that a low-income household 
living in a high-poverty neighborhood or a predominantly minority neighborhood has access 
to far fewer social service opportunities than such a household in an affluent, predominantly 
white neighborhood. My finding on the negative effect of social services density on the 
likelihood of moving is consistent with Allard’s finding. Nevertheless, it is difficult to 
determine whether households in neighborhoods with lower access to social services moved 
to neighborhoods where relatives or friends lived for a further dependency on social 
resources, or whether households who had initially fewer options to get social services and 
inevitably relied on local social networks moved to neighborhoods which exhibit a greater 
access to social services. In either cases, the availability of vouchers may encourage 





the degree of social services at the destination, and even increase the probability of exposure 
to an abundant quality social services. 
 Since my finding also suggests that households tend to move back to their initial 
neighborhoods when they have strong kinship and friendship in these neighborhoods, it 
would be essential for housing vouchers to offer housing search services, such as information 
on available social services in voucher recipients’ preferable neighborhoods. Voucher 
households might move back to the baseline neighborhood because they failed to link 
themselves to local social networks in a new neighborhood which would have provided them 
with resources and information around the neighborhood. As discussed in Galster and Killen 
(1995), there would be no improvement in an individual’s perceived metropolitan opportunity 
set without social networks that acts as an outlet to neighborhood opportunities, even if the 
actual opportunity has increased following a move. In this sense, in order to relocate more 
low-income households to high-opportunity neighborhoods, housing search services should 
be expanded to connect voucher households with information and available resources, 
particularly with respect to social services. 
 
6.1.3. Vehicle Access 
My findings on the effect of vehicle access on locational attainment have implications for 
policies designed to enhance access to opportunity for low income households. I find that 
while the random assignment to a low-poverty neighborhood had long-term impacts on a few 
of desirable locational outcomes, these impacts tended to be much smaller and less significant 
than voucher use alone. Thus, the expansion of the Housing Choice Voucher program 
supported by expanded housing search services that provide information about the 





poverty de-concentration and access to opportunity over time than residential mobility 
programs such as MTO which require households to move to low-poverty neighborhoods.  
My results also suggest that housing search services should be tailored to the 
transportation needs of households receiving assistance. Transporting those without access to 
a car to prospective residential locations along with providing information about the public 
transportation options available in different neighborhoods may help to improve the number 
and quality of units inspected prior to a housing search. This policy recommendation is 
echoed by Shroder (2002), who finds that car ownership and the intensity of housing 
counseling services both increase the likelihood of lease-up among Moving to Opportunity 
program participants. He goes on to argue that while providing long-term transportation 
services may be expensive, combining such assistance with other educational programs may 
go a long way towards increasing the rate at which mobility program participants successfully 
lease-up in desirable neighborhoods. 
Another implication of my findings is that combining rental vouchers with subsidies 
for automobile vouchers may be one possible approach to expanding the location choices 
available to low-income households. Alternatively, the increased availability of short-term 
car rental services such as ZipCar and Car2Go suggests that rental car use subsidies may be 
equally as effective at a lower cost. These services may be particularly useful to households 
with at least one licensed driver but who do not have sufficient assets to own and maintain a 
car. Coordination of housing voucher assistance with nonprofit car donation services and 
rideshare services is a third possibility. For example, the Baltimore Housing Mobility 
Program (BHMP) partnered with a local nonprofit car ownership program, Vehicles for 
Change, to help their voucher holders purchase a donated used car when moving to an 
opportunity area outside the city of Baltimore. BHMP also provided funding for state-





auto-based travel will exacerbate the negative externalities associated with auto use, 
including congestion and air quality degradation. Furthermore, car ownership itself entails 
costs that accrue directly to owners, which may place undue burdens on low income families. 
These tradeoffs should be considered with any auto-based mobility strategy. 
 
6.2. Conclusions 
Housing policy has struggled for decades not only with the provision of affordable, adequate 
quality residential units to the most needy but also with the geographic dispersion of those 
from neighborhoods with concentrated poverty. Housing vouchers are designed to promote 
more housing options in the private market, but voucher recipients are still constrained in 
moving to neighborhoods in which opportunities are expanded for low-income households. 
The growing body of evidence linking neighborhood conditions to the economic and health 
outcomes of children in poverty points to the need for a better understanding of how housing 
vouchers increase access to opportunity. While previous studies have explored the impacts of 
housing vouchers, it still remains unclear what factors prevent voucher recipients from 
relocating to opportunity neighborhoods. 
 To fill the gap in the literature, I examined the constraints that housing voucher 
households face in neighborhood choices by addressing three barriers at the market, program, 
and individual levels. Drawing upon data from the Moving to Opportunity survey and various 
tract-level characteristics, I explored trends in affordable housing supply and segregation, 
analyzed social networks as a determinant of mobility, and estimated the effect of vehicle 
access on locational attainment. I find that housing vouchers have provided more housing 
options to low-income households in an era of declining affordable housing stock, but these 
options are segregated in high-poverty neighborhoods. Small Area Fair Market Rents that 





terms of the difference in affordability levels in low-poverty neighborhoods and high-
percentage-white neighborhoods. Social networks also tend to bind voucher recipients to their 
poor, initial neighborhoods. Although less access to neighborhood-level social services 
promotes moves out of the first neighborhood, households are likely to move back to their 
initial neighborhoods when they have strong kinship and friendship there. With regard to 
vehicle access, having access to a vehicle has impacts that are more significant and more 
consistently associated with locational outcomes than any other characteristic including lease-
up status. While households with vehicles live in areas with more access to open space, 
having a vehicle also encourages moves to neighborhoods that are less conducive to walking 
and less accessible to jobs and transit. 
 Housing vouchers can be improved in such a way that reduces obstacles in residential 
location choices and expands housing options in high-opportunity neighborhoods. By 
allowing higher payment standards in expensive markets based on zip code, the 
implementation of Small Area FMRs would expand housing options and reduce the 
segregation of affordable housing across low-income neighborhoods and high-percentage-
white neighborhoods. Housing search services can be tailored to the particular needs of 
individual voucher recipients not only by offering a list of available residential units in 
neighborhoods that are in close proximity to their family members and friends, but also by 
providing voucher households with information of social resources in high-opportunity 
neighborhoods. It can be further expanded to consider access to vehicle and access to public 
transportation. Combining housing vouchers with subsidies for automobile vouchers may be 
one possible approach to expanding the location choices available to low-income households. 
My findings call for a more nuanced reframing of the geography of opportunity 
debates. An understanding of the neighborhood mobility of MTO participants calls into 





opportunity neighborhoods. Policymakers should address market, program, and individual 
issues based on an in-depth understanding of underlying factors that affect residential 
location choices of low-income households with respect to access to opportunity. More 
importantly, it is crucial to inform voucher recipients of all available housing and 
neighborhood opportunities through housing assistance. Given that housing vouchers have 
provided households with a spatially heterogeneous opportunity structure and full 
information on opportunities without filtering, the goal of “moving to opportunity” may be 
more usefully rephrased as “moving to the uniquely customized opportunities.” 
 In addition to contributing to the ongoing debates on the geography of opportunity, 
my findings are expected to bridge the gap between research and policy with regard to how 
housing assistance programs could be improved in the context of the federal government’s 
charge to Affirmatively Further Fair Housing (AFFH). A final AFFH rule places emphasis on 
enhancements to taking actions that address significant disparities in housing needs and in 
opportunity accessibility. My focus on barriers of the housing voucher program sheds new 
light on the role of the federal government in rethinking the program rule and goals and in 
developing strategies in conjunction with other services and subsidy programs that increase 
integration and access to opportunity. Empirically, my results on affordable housing 
inequality and locational attainment adds depth to the online mapping and data-generating 
tool provided by HUD, the AFFH Data and Mapping tool (AFFH-T), for communities to 
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